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Anti-suit injunction in its rudimentary form of life, under the cloak of a writ of prohibition,  
was a device initially invented by English Law for the effective confrontation of the relentless, 
at that time, jurisdictional competition between state and ecclesiastical courts by curbing the 
torrential expansion of the latter’s competence1,2. Subsequently, it was gradually transformed 
into the so-called common injuction3, rendered by the Court of Chancery4, so as to function as 
a bar to the exercise of common law courts’ jurisdiction5. Then, by acting solely in personam6, 
it hampered the filing of an action or even the enforcement of a judgment when contravening  
                                               
1 Wilsom, "Let Go of That Case!British Anti-Suit Injunctions against Brussels Convention Members", 
Cornell Inte’l L.J.,Vol.36:Iss. 1, Article 9, available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.Edu/cilj/vol36 
/iss1/9 (accessed on 07.11.2015 at 19.38 p.m.); Μουσταΐρα, Forum Non Conveniens-Η επιείκεια στο 
πλαίσιο της νομιμότητας, σελ.35. 
2 Grains of anti-suit injunction’s model have been evidenced to be found in Ancient Rome as well, see 
Roberson, "Comity be Damned:The Use of Antisuit Injunctions against the Courts of a Foreign Nation", 
U.Pa.L.Rev., Vol. 147 (No.2 Dec.,1998), p.413.  
3 Hayton, "The development of equity and the "good person" philosophy in common law systems",  
ConV L, Editorial (2012), p.4; Hartley, "Antisuit Injunctions and the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments Convention", Int’l & Comp. L.Q., Vol.49, No.1 (Jan., 2000), p. 168.     
4 It shall be outlined that the early English judicial system had been unified and therefore under its aus-
pices law and equity were applied by the same courts, see Roberson, op.cit., p.413. Nevertheless, sub-
sequently, the function of common law courts retrograded for they performed their duties in a strigent 
and stiff way.Thus, a two-tier network of jurisdiction was introduced, based on the distinction between 
common and equity law in order for the latter to cure the vacuums of the former, Ward-Akhtar, English 
Legal System, pp.5-6. Under that dual system, the Court of Chancery was a specialist equity court. Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere’s speech in the Earl of Oxford’s case (1615) encapsulates the very essence of that 
pliable concept, as opposed to the rigidity of law, by underlining that «……The Cause why there is a 
Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general 
Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstance. The Office of 
the Chancellor is to correct Mens Consciences for Frauds, Breach of Trusts, Wrongs and Oppres-
sions,of what Nature so ever they be, and to soften and molify the Extremity of the Law……» (emphasis 
added) available at https://www.griffith.edu. au/__data/assets/pdf_file /0012/188688/early-interve nt io 
n.pdf (accessed on 08.11.2015 at 18.23 p.m.). Afterwards, its competence has been transferred to the 
High Court Chancery Division by the Judicature Act 1873.   
5Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Trasnational Litigation,p.172 available at https: //books.google. 
gr/books?id=XBfoA-zf4xoC&pg=PA174&lpgA174&dq=castanhov+v+brown+root&source=bl&ots= 
Va2Md6SnuQ&sig=f8tur8ydzHnVGdbLSFuYaBV3fd8&hl=el&sa=X&ved=0CD8Q6AewBWoVChM 
IztqTuq2JyQIVC4ksCh05IAEu#v=onepage&q=castanho%20v%20brown%20root&f=fals(accessed on  
08.11.2015 at 21.15 p.m.).   
6 Martin, Modern Equity, pp.7-8 and 17-20. 
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good conscience7. Under that version, injuction was infused by the concept of equity, which 
requiring the avoidance of unconscionable, dishonest and unreasonable conduct between the 
parties to a transaction has remained its cardinal characteristic up until today8.In the course of 
                                               
7 Good conscience circumscribed in a negative fashion Chancelors’ competence by authorizing them to 
intervene into common law courts’ judicial power every time a case appeared, in their view, to be con-
trary to its requirements, Martin, op.cit.,p.8. Hence, dispensation of justice was literally utterly 
contigent on each Chancellor’s subjective perception of good conscience or, in accordance with a pro-
verbial expression, "Chancellor’s foot". See an exhaustive inquiry into its meaning, Klinck, Conscience, 
Equity and the Court of Chancery in early modern England, available at 
http://samples.sainsburysebooks. co. uk /9780754693444 _sa mple_947596.pdf (accessed on 
08.11.2015 at 19.25 p.m.) passim; Powell,  "“Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s conscience and con-
structive trusts", available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/view conte 
nt.cgi?article=4192&context=lcp (accessed on 08.11.2015 at 20.10 p.m.). At that point, it should be 
crystallized that the Chancery functioned at two dinstict levels.On the one hand, it filled the substantive 
gaps of common law. Therefore, it took action on the condition that common law remedies were ineffi-
cient to abide by equity for example due to the absence of specific performance claim under common 
law, see David-Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World today, pp.341-343. So, in such a case a 
Chancellor once characteristically exclaimed «……You have made a promise. Promises are meant to 
be kept. Your immortal soul will be in danger if  you do not keep your promises. I the Chancellor (who 
was originally a bishop) have a duty to safeguard your immortal soul. Accordingly, for the good of 
your soul, I am going to keep you in my prison until you decide to keep your promise......» available at 
http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/prof _dev /BPC/ cou rse_ fi les/Equity%20-
%20Young%20J.pdf (accessed on 08.11.2015 at 19.00 p.m.). On the other hand, it interfered with 
common law courts’ jurisdiction on equitable grounds. Exactly that function is the ancestor of the cur-
rent notion of anti-suit injunction and it is not a coinsidence that the thorn of deference to comity was 
present as well since «……much like modern courts, the early court of Chancery had to balance the 
protection of important interests through antisuit injunctions with the concern for comity between the 
courts......», Roberson, op.cit., p. 415.   
8 As observed in Turner v. Grovit and others it is «……necessary that the conduct of the party being 
restrained should fit "the generic description of conduct that is ‘unconscionable’ in the eye of English 
law". The use of the word "unconscionable" derives from English equity law. It was the courts of eq-
uity that had the power to grant injunctions and the equity jurisdiction was personal and related to 
matters which should  affect a person’s conscience. But the point being made by the use of the word is 
that the remedy is a personal remedy for the wrongful conduct of an individual.It is essentially a ‘fault’ 
based remmedial concept. Other phrases have from time to time been used to describe the criticism of 
the relevant person’s conduct, for example "vexatious" and "oppressive", but these are not to be taken 
as limiting definitions;it derives from "the basic principle of justice"……», par.24 (emphasis added) 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011213/grovit-1.htm (ac-
cessed on 07.11.2015 at 13.00 p.m.). 
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time, it has been blossomed out into its current status quo of international standing9, tailored 
by common law jurisdictions in order to obstruct foreign litigation. By becoming a radical 
weapon in their arsenal, it has repeatedly endeavored to make fatal thrusts particularly into the 
civil law lines, bearing in mind that civilian jurisdictions do not have at their disposal a func-
tional equivalent10. So, they would fight a losing battle if it were not for the ECJ to underpin 
them as deus ex machina in the forefront of that jurisdictional collision. In that sense, Europe 
has been destined to constitute the heated theatre of that smouldering war, fuelled incessantly 
by the unbridgeable gulf between the radically different legal cultures of common and civil 
law11. Exactly, this is the reason why the paper at hand concetrates on the treatment of anti-
suit injunction within the EU, employing as starting point of its analysis the anti-suit injunc-
tion concept espoused by the UK as a member of the European family and further proceeding 
to group the basic requirements for its issuance and therefore the logic behind them. After-
wards, it delineates the core counter-considerations made by the continental Europe since the 
dialectical contrast of the whole argumentation allows its comparative assessment and thus its 
objectively critical approach.  
  
 
                                               
9 Hartley, op.cit. 
10 Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Vol.1, pp.1041-1043 and especially p.1042, where the 
author characterictically comments that civil law not only defies anti-suit injunctions, but additionally 
some of its courts regard them as violation of their public policy, citing a judgment of the 
Oberladesgericht Düsseldom, according to which «……such injunctions constitute an infringement of 
the jurisdiction of Germany because the German courts alone decide, in accordance with the proce-
dural laws governing them and in accordance with existing international agreements, whether they are 
competent to adjudicate on a matter or whether they must respect the jurisdiction of another domestic 
or a foreign court (including arbitration court)……These rights are safeguarded by the Germany pro-
cedural codes and, in many respects, by the [German Constitution]. The courts must give effect to 
these rights. Instructions from foreign courts to the parties concerning the manner in which the pro-
ceedings are to be conducted and their subject-matter are likely to impede the German courts in ful-
filling this task……» (citation omitted, emphasis added).  
11 That observation echoes a general acceptance described by the House of Lords in detail  in Airbus 
Industrie GIE v. Patel and others available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 199798/ldju 
dgmt/jd980402/patel 02. htm (accessed on 22.11.2015 at 15.50 p.m.), where it is underlined that «…… 
Two different approaches to the problem have emerged in the world today, one associated with the 
civil law jurisdictions of continental Europe, and the other with the common law world. Each is the 
fruit of a distinctive legal history, and also reflects to some extent cultural differences which are be-




 ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION UNDER ENGLISH COMMON LAW 
 
I. The preliminary precondition to issue anti-suit injunction 
A pivotal stake of any courts’ system is the judicial economy, namely the conduct of a trial in 
an as much as possible convenient, prompt and inexpensive manner as those ingredients guar-
antee the success of its "procedural recipe",mainly directed to the restoration of social peace12. 
However, that ideal is jeopartized by many obstructive factors13, amongst which the potential 
of parallel proceedings poses one of the most grave menaces since by devastating the unity of 
procedure, it amplifies the cost and time required for the dispute resolution, which by defini-
tion cannot be qualified as such, given the feasiblity of issuance of two irreconcilable deci-
sions. Hence, its prevention is in principle ranked as a high priority by all the developed legal 
orders14, which based on their legal background strive to "construct" the suitable conduit lead-
ing to the attainment of that fully desirable outcome. In common law area, that machinery is 
embodied in the concept of anti-suit injunction, as follows:  
 
II. The concept of anti-suit injunction15 
Anti-suit injunction is the procedural flagship of the jurisdictional allocation system in com-
mon law legal orders since not simply dictates but additionally coerces the disobedient litigant 
into having recourse to the competent judicial mechanism, by cutting his road to the foreign 
(allegedly) incompetent one and thus placing him in the stark dilemma in choosing between 
denial or dispensation of justice, even by an non-favorable forum. Specifically, functioning 
solely ad personam, it pursues to block a party to a dispute from commencing or persisting 
with an abroad litigation. That threshold feature indicates that the supply of anti-suit injunc-
                                               
12 Of course the other fundamental concern of civil trial is the unearthing of the substantial truth, which 
however often is sacrificed at the altar of the velocity. In essence, the best possible equilibrium be-
tween them is the perpetual goal of civil procedural law.   
13However, most of them are endogenous, meaning they are contained in the inherent flaws of the pro-
cedure itself, such as for example the time of submitting the legal assertions, as opposed to the parallel 
proceedings factor, which is exogenous, namely it constitutes an external obstacle to the undermined 
trial.    
14 Nevertheless, it is submitted that comity considerations shall prevail over the parallel proceedings 
discomfort, see Baer, "Injunctions against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a Trasna-
tional Approach", Stan.L.Rev., Vol.37, No. 1(Nov.,1984),pp 163 and 173. 
15The exaclty reverse case is represented by the so-called anti-arbitration injunctions, which are granted 
by state courts with the ulterior purpose to block the smooth operation of arbitration proceedings. See, 
Lew-Mistelis-Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, pp.363-364. 
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tion is an unambiguously hostile to the foreign jurisdiction action and as such a purely offen-
sive operation. So, by definition its issuance indispensably presupposes the occurence of spe-
cial circumstances, the degree of strigency of which sufficiently differ in accordance with the 
national identity of the granting authority16. In any event, their particularization takes always 
into account that anti-suit injunction, aiming at rendering substantial justice by preventing 
unconscionable procedural conducts undertaken by the parties to a dispute, is an equitable 
remedy and as such of exceptional nature. Those  particular conditions justifying the issuance 
of anti-suit injunctions under English considerations will be elaborated on in the following: 
 
III.The power to issue anti-suit injunction  
At the outset, it should be underscored that systematic grounds behove the paper to prelimi-
narily draw a basic distinction regarding the entites vested with the authority to issue anti-suit 
injunctions, namely state courts and arbitral tribunals, since they base their power to dogmati-
cally diversied legal foundations.Besides, that conceptual dichotomy is practically required as 
well, as it will certainly conduce the thread of that analysis to unravel in such a way so as to 
arrive at legally consistent valuations and thus at last to reach constructive conclusions. More 
specifically: 
 
1. State Courts’ power 
State judicial mechanism is endowed with litigation "natural monopoly", by virtue of which it 
enjoys the inherently self-contained "competence-competence" to autonomously decide upon 
its jurisdiction over a given case. Once that adjudication is positive, the local forum is author-
ised to radically intervene into the foreign forum’s realm by the way of anti-suit injunction in 
order to safeguard its legal order. In that respect, self-evident precondtion for the exercise of 
that power appears to be the definite affirmation that local courts do have competence over 
the difference at question. Indeed, that conclusion in principle forms the basic rule, but as re-
gards the UK approach there is a crucial variation aknowledged by its jurisprudence. Namely: 
                                               
16See, Born, op.cit., pp.1036-1041,  in which it is illustrated the different approaches embraced by Eng-
lish and U.S. law, inter allia, upon the most typical example, the  issuance of anti-suit injunctions in the 
case of arbitration agreemements infringed by commencement of litigation by the recalcitrant party. In 
that event, whilst the former takes a much more liberal view fervently supporting a right to anti-suit 
injunction grantig, the latter seems to adopt a by far more conventional and thus restrictive stance, 
drawing a distinction as to whether the disobedient party participates or not in arbitral proceedings. So, 
if in parallel she/he appears before arbitral tribunal-patenlty for challenging its jurisdiction-, she/he is 
more likely to be granted an anti-suit injunction. By contrast, if she/he undermines its authority by his 
striking absence, U.S. courts are inclined to provide anti-suit injunctions in order to clearly condemn 
that anti-procedural conduct.  
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According to that case-law an English forum retains its power to grant anti-suit injunction, 
provided that its jurisdiction over the dispute is typically established, even where the foreign 
forum is the only one before which a claim can be brought in an ad hoc situation. This exactly 
was the cace in Tropaioforos (No2)17 where a shipowner filed a lawsuit before English courts 
against a co-insurer and in parallel agreed that the ruling at stake would be binding, irrespec-
tive of its content, for all, including the other co-insurers, who not being sued were not liti-
gants in the given dispute. Nevertheless, when the English court dismissed the claim, in abso-
lute violation of the aforementioned undertaking the claimant blatantly brought a second ac-
tion before Greek courts against the non-participants in the first trial co-insurers. Under those 
conditions, the last ones applied for an anti-suit injunction prohibiting the continuance of 
Greek proceedings before an English court, which in turn, holding that it did have compe-
tence by virtue of the Order 11 of  rule 1 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, decided to 
varcare il Rubicone by issuing an anti-suit injunction in order to enforce the crucial contrac-
tual obligation; and it acted so despite its ruling amounting to denial of justice as the plaintiff 
was hampered by the given agreement to having recourse to any other forum.        
Furthermore, in addition to that purely typical prerequisite, construed rather liberally by the 
English judicial praxis, there can be enumerated three main categories of substantial18 re-
quirements that shall be met for the permissible issuance of anti-suit injunctions. Specifically: 
 
a) Legal bases of anti-suit injunction 
A vast jurisprudence has progressively specified the conditions, which render the granting of 
anti-suit injunctions legitimate and it is not a coincidence that all of them converge under a 
single common denominator, the serving of the very essence of justice by overcoming unfair 
clearly legalistic technicalities. Brevitatis causa, the paper rests emphasis solely upon the key 
points of the basic legal bases that nurture the international debate between case-law and aca-
demic community.   
 
i) Forum non-convenience 
Forum non-conveniens19,20 is one more common law procedural peculiarity, the backbone of 
which is structured upon the notion that a court is permitted to stay its proceedings on the de-
                                               
17 See for a brief presentation of the case in Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ. 282.  
18 That characterisation does not refer to the classical civilian distinction between procedural and sub-
stantive law, but it connotes the closer connection of those prerequisites with the evaluation as to 
whether anti-suit injunctions are to be granted or not, even if most of them doctinairily belong, at least 
on their face, to the procedural law.  
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fendant’s request where she/he maintains that the natural forum21 of that case is placed in an-
other jurisdiction22.Its precise contsruction has been shaped in harmony with the particular 
legal background of each country following the Anglo-American judicial system23,24. As re-
gards the UK, its notional evolvement started its journey as follows: 
Basically, the seeds for its formulation were planted by the concepts of vexatious, oppressive 
and abusive proceedings25,which for a long time were acknowledged as the only legitimate 
ground for obtaining a suspension. In its landmark ruling in Atlantic Mark26, the House of 
Lords refined the aforementioned terms in order to "stretch" their content to their interpreta-
tive limits so as to further extend the possibility of stay judicial procedures. The crowning of 
that extra-expansive reading was the approach of the House of Lords adopted in MacShannon 
v. Rockaware Glass Ltd27, which was very characteristically expressed by the comment of 
Lord Salmon that «……the real test of (whether to grant a stay) depends upon what the court 
                                                                                                                                      
19 The term stems from the forum "non competens" concept, which was initially formulated by the 
Scottish jurisprudence of the 19th century, see for stimulating historical details in Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., 
σελ.9-14.  
20 It is very interesting that in Re Harrolds (Buenos Aires), the court of appeal clarified that «……it is 
very important to remember……that "conveniens" is not adequately translated as "convenient". It is 
used in the sense in which lawyers use the word convenience, as in the phrase "balance of conveniens" 
in cases when the court is deciding whether or not to grant an injunction. In such cases what the court 
is trying to do is achieve a balance of justice, or a balance of fairness  between the parties, upholding 
existing rights and not upsettig matters which later will have to be undone, preserving the status quo so 
far as is reasonably possible. That is not convenience in the sense of what is nice and easy for the 
parties in any proper sense, and nor here do the words forum non conveniens mean the most handy 
court into which to pop……» (emphasis added), available at http://www.uniset.ca/lloydata/css/1992 
Ch72.html (on 29.11.2015 at 19.37p.m.).  
21 That is defiened «……as being " that with which the action had the most real and substantial con-
nection" and Lord Goff said……"It is for connecting factors in this sense that the court must first 
look"……», see in Re Harrolds (Buenos Aires),ibid.. 
22 Harris, "The Brussels I Regulation and the Re-emergence of the English Common Law", The Euro-
pean Legal Forum (E) 4-2008, p.I-183, available at http://www.simons-law.com /library/pdf/e/88 8.pdf 
(accessed on 11.11.2015 at 00.05 a.m.).   
23 O’ Brian Jr, "The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: The Way Forward", MLR, 
Vol.66, No. 4 (Jul.,2003), p.496. 
24 See for a meticulous description of the English and U.S. approach in Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ. 17-125. 
25 Pistis, "Forum non-conveniens", available at http://www.judicium.it/old_site/news/pistis01.html (ac-
cessed on 11.11.2015 at 00.38a.m.);Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ.97.  
26 See Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ. 97. 
27 ibid.  
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in its discretion considers that the justice demands.......»28. Nonetheless, despite the purity of 
intentions the very fact remained that the implied, up to that point, forum non-conveniens idea 
was plunged into murky darkness. Nevertheless, the notable judgment of the House of Lords 
in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd 29 cast new light upon that obscurity by determin-
ing certain factors that are to be used for its assessement. Specifically30: 
a) A forum is considered as more proper, in other words convenient, to seize of an action pro-
vided that it is better qualified for serving the interests of all parties and the ends of justice31, 
assertion the onus of proof of which is on the defendant.  
b) The criteria to be taken into account are indicatively determined and are primarily central-
ised upon painting the best possible overall picture of a case.In that vein, the law applicable to 
the dispute constitutes the decisive element, especially where there is a choice of law clause 
as obviously the more suitable forum for delivering a decision is only that applying its own 
law. Other equally crucial parameters colouring court’s judgment are, inter alia, the proximity 
of witnesses and in general of evidences and the parties’ residence or place of business. 
c) It is for the claimant to counterattack by contending that the allegedly more appropriate and 
thus convenient forum cannot warrant restoration of justice for her/him.   
While under those circumstances it is within court’s discretionary power32 to regard itself as 
non-convenient forum in order to negatively define its competence by staying proceedings, 
the miror effect of that doctrine involves the exactly opposite instance. Namely, the case 
where a court, considering on the aforementioned grounds that it actually is the convenient 
                                               
28 The exact passage is exctracted from Pistis, op.cit. 
29 See the full text of that decision available at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/ 
UKHL/1986/10.html&query=title+(+spiliada+)&method=boolean (accessed on 11.11.2015 at 01.45 a. 
m.). 
30 Pistis, op.cit.; Leow, "Forum non-conveniens: English or Australian approach", S.AC.L.J., Vol.2 
(1990), p.44, available at http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/SAL% 20Journal/Attachmen ts/16/ 
1990-2-SAcLJ-041Leow. p df (accessed on 12.11.2015 at 00.20 a.m.);Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ.101-103. 
31 That point expresses the original question of the forum non-conveniens doctrine, as is described in 
the old decision in Société du Gaz de Paris v. Société Anonyme de Navigation  "Les Armateurs 
Francais" delivered by the House of Lords cited in Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non-Conveniens in 
Anglo-American Law", Colum. L. Rev., Vol.29 No1 (Jan.1929), p. 20, according to which «……If in 
the whole circumtances of the case it be discovered that there is a real unfairness to one of the suitors 
in permitting the choice of a forum which is not the natural or proper forum, either on the ground of 
convenience of trial or the residence or domicile of parties, or of its being either the locus contractus, 
or the locus solutionis, then the doctrine of  forum non conveniens is properly applied……» (citation 
ommited).  
32 Harris, op.cit. 
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forum, positively defends its jurisdiction against the invasion of a foreign, incovenient one. 
Exactly in that event, it is equipped with the anti-suit injunction weapon in order to disarm the 
latter by preventing the (potential) claimant from bringing or continuing proceedings before it. 
That conclusion was assertively reached in Castanho v. Brown & Root33 ruling, which in or-
der to restrain foreign proceedings slavishly applied the forum non-conveniens test. However, 
the content of the latter,viewed through the hermeneutic prism of the interpretative aspect en-
dorsed by the Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd, was considerably broad and therefore 
as such vested English courts with almost absolute authority to manipulate foreign jurisdic-
tions34,35. Hence, the Privy Council in Societé Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale (S.N.I.A.S.) 
v. Lee Kui Jak36, with the clear intention to significantly shrink that power, returned to the 
oppressive and vexatious proceedings concepts of the pre-Atlantic case era, as a distinct con-
dition to be satisfied in order for a foreign forum to be evaluated as non-convenient37,which 
shall coincide cumulatively with the criteria established by Spiliada. Furthermore, it took a 
step forward by totally shifting the burden of proof on the defendant, who, appliying for the 
granting of anti-suit injunction, ultimately shall additionally convince the court that the claim-
ant of foreign proceedings will not suffer any injustice by being deprived of benefits con-
ferred upon her/him by the foreign jurisdiction. So, under that construction, the application of 
forum non-conveniens legal basis for granting anti-suit injunction has significantly redressed 
the balance between the foreign forum’s alleged inconvenience and the local forum’s conven-
ience and in so doing has come to its maturity.    
That equilibrium coupled with the discretionary character of forum non-conveniens apparatus 
has rendered it a powerful procedural tool, which offers to common law courts a greater lati-
tude for adjusting their judgment to the specific circumstances of each case, which addition-
ally are contained in an open-ended list of parameters centralizing the resolution of a dispute 
on a specific jurisdiction. So, in the light of the adduced evidence, the judge is empowered to 
deliver an ad hoc decision predominantly premised on the indissoluble link that has been 
proven to exist ex post or/and ex ante between the case and the crucial forum, either local or 
                                               
33 See its detailed analysis in Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., pp. 99-103. 
34 See Fawcett, Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law, p.63 where the author characteris-
tically aptly comments that «……The Spiliada criteria, if unthinkingly applied to the area of restrain-
ing foreign proceedings, would have led to English courts restraining foreign proceedings on the mere 
basis that the natural forum for trial was England……».   
35 See Colier, Conflict of laws,p.101;Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ.280-281.  
36 See the factual background in Colier, op.cit., pp.101-102.  
37 See Colier,op. cit., pp.101-102;Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., σελ.269-271. 
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foreign one38,  and in so doing she/he dispenses individual justice, meaning adaptable to the 
factual background of the case in question and therefore by far much fairer39.   
 
ii) Forum selection agreements  
Forum selection agreements are defined those conferring jurisdiction onto a court (proroga-
tio), even if the latter is extraneous to the case at question, and/or ruling out the authority of 
the otherwise competent one (derogatio)40,41. Despite the fact that procedural law echoes pub-
lic policy considerations of the forum and therefore in principle cannot be by-passed, those 
agreements chiefly serve utterly private interests. Via them, specifically, each party pursues 
to render exclusively competent the courts of her/his place of business in order to seize the 
chance to be benefited in terms of a favourably prejudiced treatment presumably provided by 
local forums and also avoidance of excessively money and time-consuming abroad proceed-
                                               
38 While in the first event the court adjudicates upon the exercise of its own jurisdiction, in the second 
one it goes to the length of divesting itself of its competence, which in essence amounts to a denial to 
exert its authority. Nevertheless, the underlying ratio of that disobedience lies at the very heart of jus-
tice itself and specifically in the lofty idea of doing in concreto justice.  
39 The practical aspect of the forum non-conveniens doctrine, which is the relief of the overburdened 
dockets, was early underlined by the American pragmatism, Blair,op.cit., p. 1. 
40 Κεραμεύς, Αστικό Δικονομικό Δίκαιο-Γενικό Μέρος, σελ.78-79. 
41 They are governed by the lex fori, which means that the general rule is that the judge applies the pro-
cedural law of the forum unless the case is marked by internationality (The element of internationality 
has been proven rather controversial in the operation of the "Brussels I Regulation" and its forerunner 
the Brussels Convention, see for a concise presentation of the problem in Magnus-Mankowski, Magnus: 
Brussels I Regulation, Art.23 F in V par.23-26, pp.380-382). Then, the existence of an international 
legal instrument preponderates over any local regulation. At regional level provided that the precondi-
tions set up by article 23 (that article succeeded art.17 of the Brussels Convention) of the "Brussels I 
Regulation"[Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 "on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters" (OJ L012 16/01/2001 
p.0001-0023)] or by the subsequent provision 25 of the Regulation "Brussels I recast" [Regulation EU 
No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 "on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters" (recast) (OJ 
L351/1-32 20/12/2012)], which applies on or after 10 January 2015 (art.66 §1 Brussels I recast), are 
fulfilled, they are subject to the nornative framework of the respective aforementioned stat-
utes.Worldwide, they are currently dealt with by the Hague Convention of 30th June 2005 on "Choice 
of Court Agreements" [Its text is available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-
e0972510d98b.pdf (acces sed on 13.11.2015 at 02.45 a.m.), see for its (potential) positive impact on 
the USA, "Recent International Agreement", Har. L. Rev., Vol.119,No.3 (Jan., 2006), pp.931-938].   
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ings42. Taking into consideration those clearly individualised dimensions of civil trial, forum 
selection agreements are regarded as legitimately falling within the ambit of party autonomy 
and thus normally permitted through its principal expression, freedom of contracts.   
Freedom of contracts constitutes the steam engine of private initiative throughout the civilized 
legal world for it enables the entrepreneurialism to flourish and therefore the volume of com-
mercial transanctions to constantly soar. Despite the boundaries established by modern legis-
lations43,44, still it retains much of its power to decisively define the potential of contemporary 
economy. So, by virtue of its paramount importance, it comes as no surprise that it is express 
acknowledged by article 1:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law45, according to 
which «(1)Parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its contents, subject to the 
requirements of good faith and fair dealing, and the mandatory rules established by these 
Principles……».  
Indisputably, that provision articulates the common orientation of European legal family, but 
at the same time it reflects the tension lurking behind the words used. Namely, the invocation 
of good faith as an inherent boundary to freedom of contracts is evidently sealed by the civil 
law legal approach in complete, however, contradistinction to the upmost common law val-
ues46. Namely: 
Freedom of contract is the "holy cow" of English common law tradition to the extent to which 
the maxim pacta sunt servanda exerts its catalytic influential effect without exceptions con-
                                               
42 ibid., Art.23 A par.5, pp.373. 
43 Especially,where the counter contractual parties do not enjoy equal bargaining power, namely mainly 
in the case of consumers’ and employment contracts.  
44 However, there has been increasingly raised a skepticism towards their unlimited adoption, the basic 
argument of which is that excessive protectionism breeds abusive behaviours of the presumably weak 
party, which harm businesses and at last the economic growth.  
45 Prepared by the Commission on European Contract Law.  
46 "Good faith" is a purely civilian concept and its reference to legal text of international scope is un-
questionably the outcome of a negotiating marathon between civil and common law camps culminating 
in a compromise, which however subsequently produces many hermeneutic problems as to the essence 
of its invocation.A very striking example is the provision of art.7 of the CISG, according to which 
«……In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade……». So, while civilian lawyers advocate that the aforementioned acknowledgment of "good 
faith" entails the generation of further (positive) contractual obligations, its common law reading as-
setively refuses such an expansive interpretation since it causes great uncertainty and therefore dis-
incetivizes the parties to enter into a contract. See for a detailed analysis of that provision of the CISG, 
Goode-Kronke-McKendrick-Wool "Trasnational Commercial Law-International Instruments and 
Commentary", pp.278-291.  
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ceded in the name of such an equivocal concept, such as good faith47. That practically means 
that once an economic operator decides as free indivindual whether to contract, with whom 
and on what terms, she/he is definetely bound by that promise and cannot circumvent her/his 
contractual obligations by stratagems ideologically attired by the blowing smoke of empty, 
meaning without pre-determined and thus foreseeable content, concepts. Consequently, free-
dom of contract prevails absolutely over any other consideration and this omnipotence is very 
vividly demonstrated by the inextricably linked to it doctrine of the binding force of contracts, 
for the expression of which it was coined the emblematic term "sanctity of contracts"48, that 
overmasters over English area of private law.  
Therefore, from the common law perspective, forum selection agreements embody a promise 
which cannot be broken. Parties shall abide by contract fidelity by any means, id est even by 
way of granting anti-suit injunction.So, in that case, the latter in essence guarantees and safe-
guards the specific performance of a forum selection agreement, which otherwise would be 
reduced to a hollow threat so that the defendant would remain helpless to be led defencelessly 
by the disrespectful conduct of her/his counter party. Of course, it is well-known that as a 
matter of principle, in common law reality there is no right to the so-called in natura perform-
ance49 since damages are considered an efficient remedy50. Nonetheless, that general principle, 
deeply rooted in English legal tradition51, is allowed to be derogated from, inter alia52, where 
a contract contains a negative obligation, the violation of which can be restrained by an in-
junction53. The breach of forum selection agreements represent such a case since the positive 
undertaking made to bring a suit before a specific forum is by definition equivalent to the 
negative one not to initiate proceedings elsewhere54. It is noteworthy that despite the fact that 
                                               
47 Beale, Chitty on Contracts (General Principles), Vol.1 par.1-020/021,pp.17-20. 
48 ibid., par.1-017 in f.109, p.14. 
49 ibid, par.27-001,p.1521.  
50 The traditional core argument is that damages adequately cover the loss suffered. Nevertheless, its 
axiomatic prevalence nowadays loses ground and English courts examine in concreto whether damages 
suffice to satisfy the lender or not and afterwards issue ad hoc judgments. See for an overall analysis 
ibid., par.27-005/018,pp.1523-1531.     
51 ibid., par.27-001, p.1521 and in n.7. 
52 ibid., par.27-007/008/009/010/013/018, pp.1523, 1525-1526, 1527and 1531. 
53 Of course this is the general rule.For further details and special distinctions ibid., par.27-059/074, pp. 
1556-1565. 
54 This case remarkably resembles a category of contracts which is often allowed by the English courts 
to be enforced by injunction, namely those containing a covenant restraining competition provided that 
it is valid, which primarily means that it has limited duration. Ibid.,par.27-066, pp.1560-1561. Specifi-
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under that derogation English courts exercise their discretion to recognise a right to specific 
performance cautiously, where it is for an infringement of a forum selection agreement they 
act without the slightest hesitation. This is explained by the fact that they bear in mind teleo-
logical considerations and basically the economic ramifications deriving from the irrecover-
able breach of a forum selection agreement55, which is noticeable that it is primarily stipulated 
in cross-border transanctions.  
Undoubtedly, the enforceability of commercial contracts is their currency and once that cur-
rency is devalued, the credibility of the system will take a heavy and perhaps incurable blow, 
which would condemn the imperial reach of English law in commercial relations to its decay. 
So, in fact, the stance of English courts regarding the issuance of anti-suit injunctions for the 
enforcement of a forum selection clause is predominantly inspired by the pressing expediency 
to keep holding the reins of trasnational commerce and this is a natural pursuit on their part 
since all the empires, led by their inherent instinct of self-preservation, do not  lay down their 
arms, especially if they regard them as their traditional legal acquis. Consequently, instead of 
irrationally combating English positions, it is time to critically and creatively assimilate their 
example of prosperity56.   
  
iii) Arbitration agreements 
According to its stereotypical definition set up by article II (1) of the NYC, arbitration agree-
ment is «……an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitra-
tion all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,……»57. Therefore, that agreement in-
fuses the arbitral tribunal with the power to adjudicate upon the designated disputes and in so 
doing constructs a parallel judicial system for the dispensation of justice in a precisely defi-
nite area of law, confined by the arbitrability doctrine58. In that area, (again)59dominate pri-
vate individual interests, such as for example the necessity for a neutral60 mechanism of dis-
                                                                                                                                      
cally, they are teleologically closely connected in that they are intended to serve the unimpeded func-
tion of the market.   
55 The loss of which is very difficult to be quantified, ibid., par.27-008,pp. 15 25-1526. 
56 Vogenauer-Weatherill:Ashton, The Harmonisation of European Contract Law, p.246. 
57 In the same line, article 7 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that an arbitration agreement 
is «…… an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen 
or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not…….».  
58 Born,op.cit., pp.766-841. 
59 As is the case in forum selection agreements [see Section I under III (1) (a)  (ii)].   
60 Born, op.cit.,pp. 72-74. 
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pute resolution being centralised61 on a specific situs and rendering binding62 and final63 deci-
sions, the avoidance of money and time-consuming litigation proceedings64 through the pro-
cedural arbitral flexibility65 and the protection of privacy66 and confideciality67 of parties68. 
The prevalence of all those considerations elusidates why arbitration constitutes a "full-
blooded" born of party autonomy, towards which common law community and especially the 
English one has an exquisite sensibility, as explained in detail above69. Nevertheless,in this 
case party autonomy does not stand alone, but it is armed by further conceptual reinforcement 
in reserve.  
Specifically, as it is well-known, arbitration agreement is accompanied by certain contractual 
effects, the so-called positive and negative one, both of which are express acknowledged by 
the NYC and national statutes worldwile, as well. The former is steadily translated into the 
positive obligation to participate in arbitral proceedings in good faith, which is analyzed in 
co-operatively taking part in the whole process by affirmatively launching its smooth opera-
tion, by constituting the arbitral tribunal, paying promptly the arbitrators, abiding by the mu-
tually established procedure and so forth70. Nonetheless, however significant procedurally and 
therefore in effect substantially, in essence there is no remedy available for its enforcement by 
the way of affirmatively directing the parties to arbitration proceedings with notably rare and 
welcome exceptions, such as that provided under §4 and 206 of the FAA in the US71.  
The reverse side of the coin, id est of the positive obligation, is the negative one, according to 
which the parties to an arbitration agreement simultaneously with the commitment to promote 
                                               
61 ibid., pp.74-76. 
62 ibid., pp.76-78.  
63 ibid., pp.81-82. 
64 ibid., pp.84-86. 
65 ibid., pp.82-84. 
66 It is opposed to the publicity of the hearings and as such develops its power against third parties.  
67 It is binding only for the parties to an arbitration agreement.  
68 Born, op.cit., pp. 87-88. 
69 See Section I under III (1) (a) (ii).  
70 See Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corp. (1981) A.C.909, 
982-83, 985 (House of Lords), according to which «……a necessary implication from their [meaning 
the parties]having agreed that the arbitrator shall resolve their dispute that both parties, respondent as 
well as claimant, are under a mutual obligation to one another to join in applying to the arbitrator for 
approptiate directions to put an end to the delay……». The exact passage is extracted from Born,op.cit., 
p.1010. 
71 See Μουσταΐρα, op.cit., p.283 in f.382 where the author characterises that remedy as the "converse"  
form of anti-suit injunction.  
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arbitral proceedings self-evidently are bound themselves not to have recourse to litigation for 
its initiation cancels the expected fruits of the agreement to arbitrate, meaning the "fast-track", 
unquestionable and reliable resolution of a dispute. Hence, the NYC specifically provides in 
art.II that«……1.Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which 
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences......between them……» 
and therefore a court «……3…when seised of an action in a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement whithin the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of 
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed……». 
The "conventional" means for the fulfilment of that requirement, in terms of  their practical 
efficacy to promote arbitration, are either stay or dismissal of the lawsuit at stake. However, 
their adoption does not neutralize the poisoning of the whole procedure by the way of money 
and time unreasonable waste and as justice delayed is justice denied, it has been more than 
obvious the dire need for a more "effective medicine". That has been fleshed out in the "un-
conventional" form of anti-suit injunction, that by instantaneously intervening in the ques-
tionable litigation prevents the life of arbitration values from being irrecoverably harmed.  
From that angle, anti-suit injunction at least in arbitration context is not just another common 
law oddity, but the appropriate and necessary defense against the breach of arbitration 
agreement. The party undertaken to arbitrate by initiating litigation delivers a fatal wound to 
the very heart of arbitral agreement by canceling the reasonable expectation of the counter-
party that their designated differences, including any question concerning the validity of arbi-
tration agreement, will be resolved by the arbitral tribunal. In so doing, she/he compels the 
latter to ex ante disclaim by force any responsibility over their disputes without even having 
the opportunity to exercise its power to decide upon its own jurisdition. Against that unilateral 
and therefore arbitrary action, which being a hitting under the belt produces a fait accompli, 
the only effective reply is a crucial counterblow capable of restoring the fundamentally im-
paired contractual balance. Exactly, that response is offered by means of anti-suit injunction, 
that is so interventionist in litigation so as to call to order the violating party. So, in arbitration 
field,  injunctive relief shoud be viewed as an indispensable concomitant of arbitration 
agreement for without its power arbitration agreement is condemned to fall into complete dis-
repute, having been utterly devoid of its original allurements.      
 
b) Comity considerations  
However cogent and irresistibly appealing to the common sense of justice, English argumen-
tation has been harshly emasculated by a growing current of scathing critism permanently 
nourished by the steady comity polemic. Notwithstanding its corrosive effects, comity per se 
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is not strictly and precisely crystalized in terms of the criteria72 required to be fulfilled in or-
der to be activated. So, unavoidably, only its sweeping notion can be formed by groping about 
its traces in some crucial turning-points of its history.  
First of all, comity ascribes the latin term comitas gentium73, id est the civility of nations, and 
was conceived by the Dutch school of legal thought represented by the titanic figure of Ulrich 
Huber to vindicate the application of foreign law by local forums74. Thoughout the 18th and 
19th century, based on its discretionary nature, courts either advanced the invocation of for-
eign legislation or absteined from it on grounds of public policy75. Meanwhile, that concept 
was successfully trasplanted to the fertile and mature legal syllogism of the pre-eminent judge 
and scholar, Joseph Story who fierily embraced it so as to lay the foundations of the conflict 
of laws moot question in the US76, which christened Private International Law. In 1895, the 
US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot formulated its noted definition, according to which 
«……’Comity’, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, 
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citi-
zens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws......»77.  
Nevertheless, that approach is not only lacking the structural quality of a normative provision 
capable of being directly applied, but even the elementary form of a general principle of law 
providing specific guidelines for the application of law, namely the standards to be met, par-
ticularly taking into consideration its overflowing discretionary character. Operating to a grey 
zone between the prohibition of an absolute obligation and a mere courtesy at the same time 
without any concrete orientation, comity resembles a wayward ship drifted by the boisterous 
winds that each legal order is able and willing to unloose. So, despite its underlying lofty no-
tion of emulation of each other nation, comity can be qualified solely as a value dictating the 
mutual deference to the states’ jurisdictions, the observation of which is utterly contigent on 
their will, as the latter is expressed by the competent court that legally rationalize its decision 
                                               
72 Look Chan Ho, "Anti-suit Injunctions in Cross-border Insolvency:a restatement", Int’l & Comp. L.Q., 
Vol.52, No.3 (Jul., 2003), pp.713-717 and especially 716.       
73 Literally meaning "generosity","courtesy" towards nations.  
74 Paul, "The Transformation of International Comity", Law &Contemp. Probls, Vol.71, No.3 (Summer, 
2008), p.22. 
75 ibid., pp.22-23. 
76 Ehrenzweig, "American Conflicts Law in its Historical Perspective:Should the Restatement be “con-
tinued”?", U. Pa.L.Rev., Vol.103, No.2 (November, 1954), pp.135-138.  
77 The exact passage is exctracted from Look Chan Ho, op.cit., p.714. 
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to grant or not an anti-suit injunction by setting up certain criteria and thus boundaries to the 
exercise of its authority78.    
Under that construction, comity is morphed into a workable instrument as it takes the required 
normative shape necessarily being animated by the fundamental principles of the local forum, 
as expressed by their well-established legal institutions. Those constitute concepts that intrin-
sicaly have co-evaluated the unavoidable co-oexistence with other legal orders worldwide by 
setting up specific prerequisites allowing a local court to exert its authority but simultaneously 
curtailing it not to do so beyond their fixed boundaries. Besides, that exactly is the very func-
tion of the rules determining the domestic jurisdiction of a forum and hence are alternatively 
called rules on the international jurisdiction, beeing the keepers of the gateway to their forum 
by opening or closing it based on strict orders, their rules. So,without a universally acceptable 
notion of comity, probably in the form of an international treaty, this is the only way to go 
forward.  
Nonetheless, the automatically natural problem that arises out of that factum is its totally sub-
jective conception, id est in accordance to the legal identity of local forums, the plethora of 
which are fundamentally diversified. This ultimately means that there are as many versions of 
comity as the respective legal orders all around the world, which unavoidably augurs the clash 
of jurisdictions, which is exactly the core question of that paper79. 
                                               
78 Exactly that idea is conveyed by the judgment of the House of Lords in Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel 
and others (see for the full text of the judgment op.cit.), pursuant to which «……As a general rule, be-
fore an anti-suit injunction can properly be granted by an English court to restrain a person from pur-
suing proceedings in a foreing jurisdiction ……, comity requires that the English forum should have a 
sufficient interest in, or connection, with the matter in question to justify the indirect interference with 
the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails……» and Lord Guff continued remarking that 
«……the problem which has arisen in such an acute form in the present case requires the English 
courts to identify, for the first time, the limits which comity imposes on the exercise of the jurisdiction 
to grant anti-suit injunctions. In truth, the solution which I prefer gives……due recognition to comity 
but, subject to that, maintains……the traditional basis of the jurisdiction as being to intervene as the 
ends of justice may require……», concluding that «……The basic principle is that only the courts of 
an interested jurisdiction can act in the matter;……Such are the limits of a system which is dependent 
on a remedy of an anti-suit injunction to curtail the excessess of a jurisdction which does not adopt the 
principle, widely accepted throughout the common law world, of forum non conveniens……» (empha-
sis added). In that line of reasoning, it is worth mentioning that the House of Lords observed that it had 
no link with the case at bar since the UK did not constitute the natural forum for adjudicating upon an 
air crash having taken place in India. Hence, it denied to the French manufacturer of the aeroplane the 
granting of an anti-suit injunction aiming at discontinuing litigation in Texas courts, before which some 
victims resorted.      
79 See the Preface of that paper. 
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 2. Arbitral Tribunals’ power  
Comity reservations are considerably mitigated where anti-suit injunctions are granted by ar-
bitral tribunals in case of a breach of the contractual obligation to arbitrate by way of launch-
ing litigation by either of the parties to the arbitration agreement. Despite the de facto appre-
ciation of that practice by arbitral tribunals, it remains widely open the vexed question of their 
de iure legitimacy to act in such a fashion so as to substitute for courts’ function and therefore 
in that regard usurp to some extent their power. However,it is persuassively fairly strongly 
suggested that their authority is a "self-sown sprout" sprang up by the arbitrators’ «…… juris-
diction to sanction, by equivalent or in kind, violations of the arbitration agreement……»80 
and additionally «……to take any measure necessary to avoid the aggravation of the dispute 
or to protect the effectiveness of the award……»81. In other words, the arbitration agreement 
generates not only the right but in essence the binding and enforceable obligation to arbitrate, 
and in turn arbitrators are inherently intended to safeguard it by any means, including the is-
suance of anti-suit injunctions. But still, another query is left to be retorted concerning the 
foundation of arbitral tribunals’ authority where the arbitration agreement is per se invalid82 
and as such incapable of producing legal effects.  
Hence, it is submitted that the remoter source of such power flows from a self-luminous arbi-
tral dotrine, which is traditionally called Kompetenz-Kompetenze (Competence-Competence)83, 
according to which each and every arbitral tribunal has the innate imperium to decide upon its 
own jurisdiction, as it is prescribed by the respective arbitration agreement. Specifically, that 
authority is expressed by two dinstinct aspects, the positive and the negative one. The former 
                                               
80 Gaillard, "Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators", ICCA Congress Series, No. 13, International 
2006:Back to Basics, available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/4/5 1236275887736/media012 
178544 334520back_to_basics_eg.pdf (accessed on 09.11.2015 at 18.25 p.m.), pp.237-239. 
81 ibid., pp.239-240, see additionally pp.240-244, where the author examines in a doctrinairely con-
sistent way the sources of the arbitrators’ competence to issue anti-suit injunctions. On the contrary, it 
is maintained that there is no plain legal basis vesting arbitral tribunals with that power and therefore  
«……arbitrators should only issue anti-suit injunctions when it comes to their attention that one of the 
parties has commited fraud or otherwise engaged in abusive behavior in order to revoke the arbitra-
tion agreement……», Levy, "Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators", available at http: //www.lk-
k.com/data/document/anti-suit-injunctions-issued-arbitrators.pdf  (accessed 09.11.2015 at 20.00 p.m.), 
p.126. 
82 The case where the underlying contract suffers from a defect shall be distinguished as then the arbi-
tration agreement becomes immune to it by virtue of the separability doctrine. See for the separability 
presumption and more specifically its relation with the Kompetencz-Kompetenz doctrine in Born, 
op.cit., Vol.1, pp.872-876. 
83 ibid, pp. 855-856 and 877-966. 
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means that arbitral tribunals (affrimatively) self-determine their jurisdiction and the latter en-
tails that courts are obligated to refrain from making interlocutory decisions as regards tribu-
nals’competence. While its positive dimension is universally express acknowledged by inter-
national conventions, the UNCITRAL Model Law and innumerable national legislations in an 
almost unanimous manner, the negative one remains a bone of contention in the sense that 
there is no consensus as to the degree of courts’ abstention from adjudicating upon tribunals’ 
jurisditiction 84.   
In particular, considering the existence of chaotically diversified legal orders all around the 
world, unsurprisingly there is not an internationally stabilized position even under the aegis of 
the NYC, that attentivey avoids to touch the "hot potato" of the distribution of power between 
arbitral tribunals and state courts85. The fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law does address 
the issue, by in principle acknowledging the authority of arbitral tribunals to decide upon their 
own jurisdiction (art.16), subject to subsequent judicial review (art.34), while however at the 
same time allowing interlocutory decisions being made prior or even simultaneously with ar-
bitral proceedings (art.8 § 1]86, patenlty does not offer a sound solution. Given that it is not a 
binding legal text, the unconditional adherence to it is rather dubious as states are most likely 
to adapt its content to their legal mindset.Consequently, the international territory is utterly 
infertile to produce clear rules determining the relationship between arbitral tribunals and 
courts. So, in effect it remains the local arena, which however preserves its crucial role, taking 
into account that arbitral proceedings are governed by the procedural law of the arbtiral seat87.      
So, at national level, only the French approach approximates most closely to the negative ex-
pression in its pure form by providing in article 1458 §1 of the new CCP that «……Where a 
dispute submitted to an arbitral tribunal by virtue of an arbitration agreement is brought be-
fore a national court, such court shall decline jurisdiction……» (emphasis added). On the 
contrary, German legislative stance is much more intervenionist by allowing an interlocutory 
decision to be made prior to the initiation of aribtral proceedings or in any case under certain 
condtions in parallel with them [art.1032 (1, 2 ) ZPO]88,89.In that obviously divided environ-
                                               
84 ibid., pp. 856-872. 
85 ibid., p.858. 
86 See for a meticulous analysis of the aforementioned provisions, ibid, pp. 880-899. 
87 See a detailed presentantion of the whole issue in Henderson, "Lex Arbitri, Procedural Law and the 
Seat of Arbitration", S.Ac.L.J. ( 2014), pp.886-910 available at http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/List 
s/SAL%20Journal/Attachments/703/(2014)%2026%20SAcLJ%20886-910%20(Lex%20Arbitri%2 0-% 
20Alastair%20Henderson).pdf (accessed at 22.01.2016 at 17.32 p.m.). 
88 Article 1032 ZPO states «(1)  A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the 
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if the respodent raises an objection prior to the beginning of 
the oral hearing on the substance of the dispute, reject the action as inadmissible, unless the court finds 
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ment, the English view, as expected, traditonally sticks to parties’ agreement to arbitrate and 
by virtue of article 30 of the English Arbitration Act (1996) states that «......(1)Unless other-
wise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own substantive  jurisdiction, 
that is, as to-(a)whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, (b) whether the tribunal is 
properly constituted, and (c) what matters have been submited to arbitration in accordance 
with arbitration agreement......» (emphasis added). Nonetheless, even if the parties have not a 
priori agreed upon resorting to court, a posteriori it is offered a second chance to a party who 
participates in arbitral proceedings to seek an interlocutory decision under the condition that 
either all the parties to the dispute agree upon or at least the arbitral tribunal permits that 
action and simultaneously the court is satisfied [art.32 (1, 2)]90. 
Exactly, that kind of regulation, which namely contains the current national rules directly ap-
plicable as lex loci arbitri91, standardizes certain criteria weighed by the local legislator him-
self so as to accurately allocate the jurisdiction between state courts and arbitral tribunals; and 
in so doing, it prescribes the boundaries within which arbitral tribunals are entrenched in or-
der to legally intervene into courts’ proceedings by hampering the disobedient party to litigate 
a dispute already contractually submitted to arbitration. Therefore, a private judicial mecha-
nism, as is represented by the arbitrators, do not "put into its pocket" the sovereign authority, 
                                                                                                                                      
that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inporative or incapable of being performed. (2)Prior to 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, an application may be made to the court to determine whether 
or not arbitration is admissible (3) Where an action or apllication referred to in subsection 1 or 2 has 
been brought, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an arbitral 
award may be made, while the issue is pending before the court. », translation available at http://www. 
trans-lex.org/600550/# head_11 (accessed on 18.11.2015 at 21.05 p.m.). 
89 See, Born, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.907-910. 
90 Article 32 (1, 2) of the English Arbitration Act (1996) stipulates that «……(1) The court may, on the 
application of a party to arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties), determine any ques-
tion as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal……(2) An application under this section shall not 
be considered unless- (a) it is made with the agreement in writing of all the other parties to the pro-
ceedings, or (b) it is made with the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied:(i) that the de-
termination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs,(ii) that the application was 
made without delay, and (iii) that there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the 
court……. ».           
91 See in n.87. 
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as is incarnated by national courts, but acting intra ius it is absolutely authorised to exercise 
its discretion92.  
That construction shall surmount a last obstacle, id est the accusation that the issuance of anti-
suit injunctions might infringe the fundamental right, most often constitutionally enshrined, to 
have free access to justice rendered by state courts93. However, as aptly is submitted94, that 
freedom has been bartered away by the parties to a dispute themselves when entering into the 
arbitration agreement. Besides, it is well-known, in the framework of civil trial, given that the 
latter pertains to private interests, parties maintain the power to dispose of their rights, either 
procedural or substantive ones, by abiding with certain formalities, for it is an ex post waiver 
and as such utterly permissible. The further remark that a party resorting to litigation by defi-
nition challenges the existence of an arbitration agreement and therefore there is no legally 
binding waiver, is rather legalistic as once an arbitration agreement has at least its external 
appearance, containing parties’ consents, automatically activates the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
doctrine. Therefore parties become inescapably subject to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, 




ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION UNDER EU LAW 
 
I. The counterbalance of anti-suit injunction’s device 
The response of the EU,which has been inundated with civil law countries95, to the parallel 
proceedings peril is rested upon a radically diversified foundation stone, namely the principle 
of lis alibi pendens96, which acclaims the first-filing rule. That one empowers the court first 
seized of an action to proceed with the litigation, irrespective of its actual competence or not, 
while it forces the second one to stay its proceedings. Solely, on the condition that the former 
adjudicates upon its lack of jurisdiction, the latter is allowed to further advance its own pro-
cedure. There is no doubt that this mechanism is heavily inspired by the notion of mutual def-
                                               
92 Besides, exactly that point explains the great delicacy manifested by the arbitral tribunals seated in 
the UK against arbitrary parallel litigation, considering in addition that the latter lacks the indispensable 
according to the English Arbitration Act (1996) consent of the parties and as such shall be thwarted. 
93 See the reference to that argument and its refutation in Gaillard, op.cit., pp.241-242. 
94 ibid. 
95 In fact, the vast majority of the EU member states trace their legal legacy to civil law tradition, save 
the UK and Ireland. 
96 Which is literally translated as a dispute elsewhere pending. 
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erence to the jurisdictional sovereignty of each legal order whilst simultaneously ensures the 
predictability necessary for the smooth operation of the single judicial space within the EU97. 
Nevertheless, the blind adherence to it, as is has been set out by the Brussels I Regulation98 
and repeatedly interpeted by the ECJ, has been proven able enough to lead to inequitable and 
in the bottom line unjust effects, precipitating a crisis deeply discrediting the aforementioned 
EU legislative option, as follows: 
 
1.The lis alibi pendens rule under the Brussels I Regulation 
Αrticle 27 Brussels I Regulation99 adopts the unexceptional application of the lis alibi pendens 
rule100, which despite its stiffness has been further ossified by the action’s same cause concept 
espoused by the landmark decision Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG.v.Giulio Palumbo101. Spe-
cifically, reading that term autonomously102, the ECJ has defined it extra-expansively so as to 
                                               
97 Recital 11 of the Brussels I Regulation proclaims that «……The rules of jurisdiction must be highly 
predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domi-
cile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in 
which the subject- matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a differenet linking 
factor……» (emphasis added).   
98 The paper starts its analysis with the Brussels I Regulation for its application has dominated since its 
entry into force on 1st March 2002 (art.76 Brussels I Regulation) up until relatively recently, namely on 
10 Janury 2015 (art.81 Brussels I Regulation recast), provided that legal proceedings have instituded on 
or after that date (art.66 §1 Brussels I Regulation recast).  
99  The initial respective provision of its forerunner, namely the Brussels Convention, stated that 
«……Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought 
in the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own 
motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. A court which would be required to decline jurisdic-
tion may stay its proceedings if the jurisdiction of the other court is contested……» (art.21 Brussels 
Convention).    
100 Specifically, pursuant to that provision «……1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court 
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the juris-
diction of the court first seised  is established.2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is estab-
lished , any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court……». 
101 C-144/1986 ECR 1987 04861. 
102 As a matter of principle, the interpretation of EU law is completely autonomous, meaning detached 
from the domestic legal systems of the Members States. As such does not constitute a conventional 
method of construing a legal text, such as literal, historical or systematic one, but rather an independent 
from the national laws form of legal approach in order to promote the uniform application of EU law 
and thus decisively conduce to the accomplishment of EU policies. 
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include any issue lying at the heart of two actions103 with the result that the lis alibi pendens 
rule has easily pinched a great range of cases with its claws. In particular:         
 
2.The lis alibi pendens rule under the ECJ’s interpretation 
The ECJ has moved on to systematically unnail the common law "pettifoggeries"104 for evad-
ing parallel proceedings’s minefield by an unprecendented recital of slavishly literalistic in-
terpretation that has strived to deconstruct any point of the English positions. However, that 
attempt lacks substantial argumentation and the mechanistic invocation of article 27 Regula-
tion Brussels I does not retrieve the whole situation, as will become patent in the ensuing 
paragraphs.  
 
a) Forum non-convenience jurisprudence 
i) Owusu v. Jackson105         
In this case, the plaintiff suffered a serious diving accident on its vacation in Jamaica106. 
Hence, he brought an action before English courts, by which he suited the lessor of the holi-
day villa, who was domiciled in the UK, for breach of the contractual obligation to provide 
him a safe stay and the companies entangled with the exploitation of the beach concerned, 
which were based in Jamaica, for their tortious conduct. At first instance, the defendants ob-
jected to the competence of English courts on grounds of them being a non-convenient forum 
since the dispute was closer linked with Jamaica. Nevertheless, the submission was dismissed 
as it was decided that the domicile of one of the defendants in the UK was sufficient in order 
to establish the English jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention for all of them 107 , 
108.Ultimately,on appeal, the court chose to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
                                               
103 Specifically, in that case, the one action was inteded to enforce a contractual obligation and the ad-
versary one to rescind it. So, according to the ECJ «……The question whether the contract is binding 
therefore lies at the heart of the two actions……» (emphasis added), C-144/1986, op.cit.,at  par.16.  
104 The term is obviously used in exceess exclusively for emphatic reasons, mainly in order to stress the 
great ideological distance between common and civil law and does not imply anything else.   
105 C-281/02 [2005] ECR I-01383. 
106 Namely, it left him tetraplegic.  
107 In particular, the court ruled that it did have jurisdiction upon the UK domiciliary under the Brussels 
Convention and that the other defendants had to be sued there «……Otherwise, there would be a risk 
that the courts in two jurisdictions would end up trying the same factual issues upon the same or simi-
lar evidence and reach different conclusions……» (emphasis added), see for the reasoning of the Eng-
lish court in C-281/02 Owusu [2005], op.cit., par.18.  
108 In a previous decision in  Re Harrolds (Buenos Aires), the Englsih court of appeal adopted the very 
same stance, holding though under a rather extensive consideration, that «……For the English court to 
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upon whether it was empowered to stay its proceedings in favor of a court of a non-
contracting state as a more convenient forum and if the anwer was in the affirmative on what 
terms.  
The ECJ did not leave any open door by ruling that the rules on jurisdicition laid down by the 
Brussels Convention are in principle mandatory «……excpet in the cases expressly provided 
for by the Convention……»109 and «……That is common ground that no exception on the ba-
sis of the forum non-conveniens doctrine was provided for by the authors of the Convention, 
although the question was discussed when the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Acces-
sion of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom was drawn up……»110. Moreover, continu-
ing its thought stated that «……Respect for the principal of legal certainty, which is one of the 
objectives of the Brussels Convention……would not be full guaranteed if the court having 
jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doc-
trine……»111.Hence, «……the jurisdictional rules……should be interpeted in such a way as to 
enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to forsee before which courts, other 
than those in which he is domiciled, he may be sued……112» (emphasis added).  
That reasoning reveals the magnitude of the clearly mechanical understanding of the lis alibi 
pendens rule by the ECJ since keeping to the beaten track of purely formalistic thinking it 
invokes the necessity of protecting legitimate interests of the defendant in order to refute an 
objection raised by the defendant her/himself without even becoming aware of the logical 
contradiction contained113. So, the only sustainable argument is that one focusing on the strict 
                                                                                                                                      
refuse jurisdiction, in a case against a person domiciled in England, on the ground that the court of 
some non-contracting state is the more appropriate court to decide the matters in issue does not in any 
way impair the object of the Convention of establishing an expeditious, harmonious,and, I would add, 
certain, procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, since ex hypothesi if the English court  
refuses jurisdiction there will be no judgment of the English court to be enforced in the other contract-
ing states. Equally and for the same reason such a refusal of jurisdiction would not impair the object of 
the Convention that there should, subject to the very large exception of article 4, be a uniform interna-
tional jurisdiction for obtaining the judgments which are to be so enforced……I do not accept that ar-
ticle 2 [of the Brussels Convention] has the very wide mandatory effect which Hobhouse J. would as-
cribe to it where the only conflict is between the courts of a single contracting state and the courts of a 
non-contracting state……», (citation ommited), op.cit.   
109 See C-281/02 [2005], op.cit., at par.37.  
110 ibid., at par.37. 
111 ibid., at par.38. 
112 ibid., at par. 40. 
113  Harris, op.cit., p.I-184 where the author pointedly observes that «……The reasoning is wholly erro-
neous on this point, as English courts only grant a stay if the defendant himself asks for it;and a de-
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wording of art. 21 Brussels I Convention, the spirit of wich art.27 Brussels I Regulation fol-
lowed. The ratio behind them, at least in the given case, however controversial might it be, de 
lege lata could not be set aside.    
    
ii) Turner v. Grovit114 
The factual background of that case refers to a British lawyer domiciled in the UK, Mr Turner, 
who was taken on by a company, that was part of a wider group directed by Mr Grovit, in or-
der to provide his services as Group Solicitor115. Mr Turner performed his duties in London, 
but in November 1997 he moved to Madrid, at his request, where he worked for the same em-
ployer on the premises of a Spanish company, member of the group, for only 35 days116. On 
16 February 1998, he gave a notice of resignation and on March 1998 he commenced pro-
ceedings against his (English) employer before the Employment Tribunal in London for 
«……unfair and wrongful dismissal……»117. Meanwile, the Spanish company118 filed a law-
suit against Mr Turner before Madrid courts as well, claiming for damages119 suffered for al-
                                                                                                                                      
fendant who asks a stay is hardly then likely to object that, if the court grants it, his legal certainty 
about whether the English court will hear the case or not is compromised ……». However, immediate-
ly after he reverses the argument, at least rationalizing it, by highlighting the necessity of legal certain-
ty for the sake of claimant, who obviously should be a priori aware of which court is competent for 
adjudicating upon her/his suit in order to save money and time. 
114 C-159/02 [2004] ECR 2004 I-03565.  
115 Under that capacity, subsequently his contract was tranferred to another member of the group. 
116 See the detailed facts and the course of judicial proceedings at par.7-20 of the decision in C-159/02 
Turner [2004] , op.cit. 
117 See Turner v. Grovit and others available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 200102/ 
ldjudgmt/jd011213/grovit-1.htm (accessed on 13.11.2015 at 22.30p.m.),  at par.10, where specifically it 
is clarified that «……The nature of the claim he made was that there had been repudiatory breaches of 
his contract of employment which were tantamount to dismissing him……». 
118 It is questionable as to whether the rule of lis pendens could apply in that case since even if, under a 
lato sensu analysis, in general lines supported by the ECJ, the cause of the two actions was considered 
as identical, the parties, at least on the face, were not. Of course, as the Court of Appeal aptly remarked 
«……looking at the substance of the matter, the actions were between the same parties in that in each 
action it was aspects of the group that was involved. Mr Grovit was the directing mind of the group 
and Changepoint SA was for the purposes of the Madrid proceedings a front for the group……», ibid, 
at par.18. Additionally, see, Kruger, "The Anti-suit Injunction in the European Judicial Space:Turner v 
Grovit", Int’l & Comp. L. Q., Vol.53, No. 4(Oct., 2004), p.1037.    
119 ibid, at par.14 «……The monetary amounts claimed……are very substantial. They far overtopped 
Mr Turner’s claim in the Employment Tribunal and, if to be sustained, would have more than can-
celled out any sum which the Tribunal might award him……» (emphasis added).  
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leged violations of his contractual obligations. In addressing that action, Mr Turner sought the 
granting of an anti-suit injunction by English courts, the stance of which is noteworthy.    
Specifically, the reasoning of the House of Lords broke the record of interpretative creativity 
as not only it diligently evaded to use the forum non conveniens phrasing as the basis for the 
issuance of the anti-suit injunction at stake, but addionally it literally thundered that  «…… 
English law attaches a high importance to international comity……»120 and «……This is the 
prime reason for strictly limiting the making of restraining orders on grounds of forum non 
conveniens……»121(emphasis added). Nevertheless, despite the nominal renunciation of the 
aforementioned, controversial under the EU law 122, doctrine, Lord Hobhouse "stole" its basic 
components, meaning the vaxation and oppression caused by foreign proceedings sought to 
be discontinued since «……The Spanish proceedings were an orchestrated response to the 
plaintiff’s application  before the Employment Tribunal and there is no candidate for the or-
chestra’s conductor but Mr Grovit……»123 so that  «……The conduct of the defendants was 
unconcionable because, in bad faith, it was designed to obstruct and frustrate the existing 
English proceedings……»124  (emphasis added). Therefore, as such they were to be ham-
pered.The only remaining obstacle for the granting of the requested anti-suit injunction was 
the presumable disrespect towards Spanish courts. In order to "pass that cape"125, Lord Hob-
house explained that «……It is recognised that to make an order against a person who is a 
party to proceedings before a foreign court may be treated as an interference (albeit indirect) 
in the foreign proceedings. Thus the English law requires the applicant to show a clear need 
to protect existing English proceedings……[which is]regarded as a legitimate subject matter 
for an English court……»126. Nonetheless, being fully aware of the negative climate against 
the injunctive relief under the Brussels Convention regime, the House of Lords ultimately had 
recourse to the ECJ’s lights.       
As highly expected, the ECJ remained set in its view, according to which the principle of mu-
tual trust dictates the uniform interpetation and application of the rules on jurisdiction laid 
                                               
120 ibid.,at par.28. 
121 ibid. 
122 ibid., at par.34 it is underscored that «……As Lord Goff said in Airbus Industrie, at p.132, the prin-
ciple of forum conveniens "has no application as between states which are parties to the Brussels Con-
vention". The present case out of which this reference arises is not such a case. The conduct of the de-
fendants was unconscionable because, in bad faith, it was designed to obstruct and frustrate the exist-
ing English proceedings, not because the Madrid court was a forum non conveniens……». 
123 ibid., at par.17. 
124 ibid.  
125 This is the accurate translation of a Greek expression which means to pass off an awkward situation.  
126 See, Turner v Grovit and others, op.cit., at par. 28. 
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down by the Brussels Convention127.Hence, it ruled that the latter «……does not permit the 
jurisdiction of a court to be reviewed by a court in another Contracting State……»128. Besides, 
the issuance of an anti-suit injunction would render «……ineffective the specific mechanisms 
provided for by the Convention for cases of lis pendens and of related actions……»129 where-
as it would be «…… liable to give rise to situations involving conflicts for which the Conven-
tion contains no rules……»130.  
Under the structure of the Brussels Convention, which did not offer any pretext to embrace 
the forum non conveniens doctrine and/or its variations, that reasoning seemed to be inescap-
able, but still the factual circumstances of the case had to awake the legal intuitions of the 
ECJ as it represented a typical case of abusive procedural conduct. If the stronger party enjoys 
the generosity to hit the much weaker one behind her/his back by counter-attacking ostensibly 
under the disguise of a third person131, then justice is severely obstructed and this is a factor, 
which should not be ignored on the grounds of protecting the doctrinaire purity of a legal in-
strument. 
   
b)Forum selection agreements jurisprudence ( Erich Gasser Gmbh v. Misat132) 
Although the main case at issue emanated from an Austian-Italian dispute, it is worth quoting 
a very representative ruling deriving again by the English courts, which manifestly demon-
strates their intrinsic comprehension upon the scope of application of the lis alibi pendens rule. 
More specifically, in the Continental Bank v. Aeakos Compania Naviera133,an American Bank 
granted a facility loan to a group of Greek ship-owners containing a clause, by virtue of which  
the last ones became subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts134,135. In spite 
of  that contractual obligation, however, they brought an action before Greek courts for claim-
ing damages under article 919 GCC. Then, the bank reacted by seeking an anti-suit injunction 
by the English courts, based on the exclusive forum selection clause. On appeal, the court, 
                                               
127 See C-159/02 Turner [2004], op.cit., at par.25. 
128 ibid., at par.26. 
129 ibid., at par.30. 
130 ibid. 
131 In this case, the Spanish company obviously acted as the alter ego of Mr Grovit. 
132 C-116/02 [2003] ECR 2003 I-14693. 
133 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/gemdoc94/pdf/18-U-en-94.pdf (acce 
ssed on 29.11.2015 at 17.35p.m.). 
134 The exact wording was that «……each defendant "irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the Eng-
lish courts"……», ibid.   
135 It is to be mentioned that the given clause and the whole substantive agreement were governed by 
English law. 
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examining the interaction between article 17 and articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Conven-
tion, adjudicated that «……Article 17 has mandatory effect……There is no discretionary 
power in the Convention itself to override the conclusive effect of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement which conforms with the requirements of article 17. It follows that if article 17 
applies its provisions takes precedence over the provisions of articles 21 and 22……»136, oth-
erwise «……It follows that a party will be able to override an exclusive jurisdiction agree-
ment which is governed by article 17 by pre-emptively suing in the courts of another contract-
ing state.The courts of the latter state which ex hypothesi have been deprived of jurisdiction 
would then be "the court first seised". The chosen court of the parties would then be obliged 
to decline jurisdiction or, if the jurisdiction of the other court is contested, to stay its proceed-
ings. In this way a party who is in breach of the contract will be able to set at naught an ex-
clusive jurisdiction agreement which is the product of the free will of the parties. The princi-
ple of the autonomy of the parties, enschrined in article 17, cannot countenance such a solu-
tion……»137, 138, 139.  
Nevertheless, the case Erich Gasser GmbH v. Misat proved that the English court of appeal 
built castles in Spain. More specifically, Gasser was an Austrian who sold children’s clothing 
to Misat, an Italian company, seated in Rome. All the invoices, issued by the former and re-
ceived by the latter, contained an exclusive selection clause in favor of Austrian courts with-
out Misat ever objecting to it. In contavention to that contractual term, Misat sought a nega-
tive declaratory relief before Italian courts whereas Gasser filed subsequently an action claim-
ing the repayment of the selling price owed by Misat in Austria. Under those circumstances, 
the Austrian court of appeal, namely the second seised, posed to the ECJ the query, inter alia, 
as to whether a court other than the court first seised could review the jurisdiction of the latter 
on the basis of an exclusive selection clause, especially where its proceedings «……take an 
unjustifiable long time (for reasons largely unconnected with the conduct of the parties), so 
that material detriment may caused to one party……?»140, 141. The ECJ replied assertively in 
                                               
136 See Continental Bank v. Aeakos Compania Naviera, op.cit. 
137 ibid. 
138 See the further analysis of that case in Σαχπεκίδου, H παρέκταση διεθνούς δικαιοδοσίας στον ενιαίο 
ευρωπαϊκό χώρο, σελ.234-240. 
139 However, as Harris neatly comments «……Even at the time, it was clear to many that the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, whatever its commercial merits in upholding the sanctity of commercial agreememts, 
could not withstand scrutiny……», op.cit., p.I-182.  
140 See C-116/02 Gasser [2003], op.cit., at par. 20. 
141  To this regard, the question seems to "borrow", even unconsciously, some of the elements of 
vaxation and/or oppression appeared in Turmer v. Grovit and others adjusted to the factual background 
of the case.  
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the negative as the grammatical wording of the crucial provision of article 21 Brussels I Con-
vention, in its view, overpowerd the competence of the designated, but subsequently seised 
court142, taking into account that the firsrt seised one was obligated to assertain its own juris-
diction ex officio143. Ultimately, premised on those considerations, the ECJ remarked that the 
problem of delaying tactics employed by a party pursuing to retard the dispute resolution144 
per se was not sufficient to challenge the reading of any article of the Brussels Convention.145 
That decision constituted a rude awakening for the English courts, which afterwards were 
forced to comply with the ECJ’s interpretative standards in similar cases, as became evident 
in IP Morgan Europe Ltd v. Primacon AG and the Others146.Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that in Gasser the reservations towards article 21 Brussels Convention derived not 
from the usual suspect, meaning the UK, but a counrty embraced the civil law tradition. This 
element speaks volume for the disfunction caused by the absolute application of the lis alibi 
pendens rule, which at least in this case, could, teleologically assessed, be counter-balanced 
by the exclusive forum selection clause. Otherweise, such an agreement, express acknowl-
edged by the Brussels Convention and all of its successors, is directly disarmed by the diver-
sionary raid to file an action before other than the designated court 147and the formal legalisa-
tion of that outcome renders it a scrap paper, on which no serious economic operator should 
be based. However, this is a very high price to be paid, especially within the EU with its well- 
known economic dimensions148.     
                                               
142 See C-116/02 Gasser [2003], op.cit., at par.47. 
143 ibid., at par.52. 
144 Specifically, underlined by the UK government. 
145 See C-116/02 Gasser [2003],op.cit., at par.53. 
146 See the analysis conducted by Weller, Hess-Pfeiffer-Schlosser, The Heideberger Report on the Ap-
plication of Regulation Brussels I in 25 Member States, Study JLS/C4/2005/03, No426-428 available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf (accessed on 
07.11.2015 at 17.50 p.m.).  
147 It merits mention that the ECJ’s tolerance towards the deliberate violation of forum selection clauses 
instigated the generalisation of the use of "torpedo actions". As such have been defined the actions for 
declaration of non-infringement of patent rights brought first before Member States, the courts of 
which suffer from lengthy delays in the dispensation of justice, in order to impede the actual patentee 
to file her/his suit before an effective forum, for example in France, Germany or the UK. This malprac-
tice begun in Italy, well-known for the tardiness of  delivering justice and thus more accurately there 
has been established the term "Italian torpedos". See, Veron, "ECJ restores Torpedo Power", IIC, 
Vol.35 (2004), pp.638-642. 
148 Despite the fact that arguments of purely economic nature have been much disregarded (see the AG 
opinion C-185/07 Tankers [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:466, at par.66),their consideration should be highly 
ranked given the ecominc aspects of the EU.   
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c) Arbitration agreements jurisprudence 
i)Allianz SpA, Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc.149 
Despite the defeat suffered in the aforementioned fronts, common law ventured to bring up 
the question upon the permissible use of anti-suit injunction within the single judicial space of 
the EU, this time under the pretence of arbitration agreements, which allow a wider latitude of 
argumentative manoeuvring due to the express exception of arbitration from the ambit of the 
Brussels I Regulation (art.1 §2d)150,151. The commencement of litigation in Italy by two insur-
ance companies152 in violation of an agreement to arbitrate providing for a situs in London153 
gave rise to English justice to get its second wind, as their counter litigant sought an anti-suit 
injunction to block the continuation of those proceedings.   
In particular, the House of Lords seised the oppurtunity to elude the trap set by the reasoning 
supported in Turner and Gasser 154, namely that in essence member states’ courts shall abstain 
from the granting of anti-suit injunctions in deference to each other’s jurisdiction, anchoring 
in the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels I Regulation regime, as it is construed expan-
sively through the interpretative lens of the ECJ. Namely, pursuant to its settled case-law, the 
Regulation at stake does not apply to the lato sensu arbitral proceedings (art.1 §2d)155, which 
                                               
149 C-185/07 [2009] ECR 2009 I-00663. 
150 Its exact wording is rather abstruse and therefore open to various interpetation, stating «……2.This 
Regulation shall not apply to:……d.arbitration……».  
151 Exactly, the same exception is contained in the Brussels Regulation recast (art.1§2d). 
152 It should be noted that they had been subrogated to their insured’s claims.  
153 More specifically, the factual background was the following: «……In August 2000, the Front Comor, 
a vessel owned to West Tankers Inc(“Tankers”) and chartered by Erg Petroli  SpA (“Erg”) collided 
with a jetty owned by Erg at Syracuse and caused damage. The charterparty was expressed to be  gov-
erned by English Law and contaided a clause providing for arbitration in London. Erg claimed upon 
its insurers......up to the limit of its insurance cover and commenced arbitration proceedings against 
Tankers in London for the excess. Tankers counterclaimed that it was not liable for any of the damage 
caused by the collision....... On 30 July 2003, the insurers commenced proceedings against Tankers 
before the Tribunale di Siracusa to recover the amounts which it had paid Erg under the policies......», 
West Tankers Inc v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA and Others, at par.10 available at htt 
p://ww.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070221/westt.pdf (accessed on 01.12.2015  
at 19.55p.m.), at par.2-3.  
154 Given that «……are both based upon the preposition that the Regulation provides a complete set of 
uniform rules for the allocation of jurisdiction between Member States and that the courts of each 
Member State have to trust the courts of other Member States to apply those rules correctly……», ibid., 
at par.10. 
155 ibid., at par. 12.  
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include not only arbitration procedures per se156,but additionally those ones pertaining to the 
protection of the right to attain the resolution of the dispute by arbitration157. So, under that 
construction, anti-suit injunctions, issued in aid of arbitral proceedings, remove the normative 
"embargo" placed upon by the Brussels I Regulation magnetic field of application and there-
fore are freely available for use. Beyond that crucial point, the House of Lords added that the 
absolute, leveling and arbitrary argument that any court order restraining a party from being 
subject to a jurisdiction is necessarily contrary to the Regulation Brussels I, is «……divorced 
from reality (lebensfremd)……»158, citing Professor Schosser description, taking into account 
that the very same exception applies to orders made in the context of other excluded catego-
ries of cases, such as those referring to insolvency proceedings159.  
Moreover, it moved on to teleologically evaluate the significance of the procedural and sub-
stantive extensions of arbitration, upon which parties have invested their dispute resolution160, 
such as for example confidetiality, neutrality and prompt deliver of justice. In parallel, it un-
derscored the decisive role of the national courts of the arbitral seat, which oversee arbitral 
proceedings based on their own national law161 and therefore should be allowed to act accord-
ingly, as is the case at question. So, in that framework, English legal order had to be acknowl-
edged the power to utilize anti-suit injunction, which is considered by it «……as an important 
and valuable weapon in the hands of a court exercising superviory jurisdiction over the arbi-
tration……»162 since «…… As Professor Schlosser also observes, it saves a party to an arbi-
                                               
156 C-190/89 Rich v. Società Italiana Impianti [1991] ECR 1991 I-03855, pursuant to par.29 of which 
«…Article 1 (4) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion provided for 
therein extends to litigation pending before a national court concerning the appointment of an arbitra-
tor, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary issue in that litiga-
tion……».    
157 C-391/95 Van Uden Maritime v. Kommanditgesellschaft in firma Deco-Line and Others [1998] 
ECR I-07091, according to par.32 of which «……Also excluded from the scope of the Convention are 
proceedings ancillary to arbitration proceedings, such as the appointment or dismissal of arbitrators, 
the fixing of the place of arbitration or the extension of the time-limit for making awards……».  How-
ever, it is underlined at par.33 that «……provisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitra-
tion proceedings but are ordered in parallel to such proceedings……» . 
158 West Tankers Inc. v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA and Others, op.cit., at par. 15. 
159 ibid., at par. 16. 
160 Such as privacy, informality, absence of any prolongation of the dispute by appeal, arbitrators’ right 
to act as amiables compositeurs, ibid, at par. 17 where Lord Hoffman concludes that «……The princi-
ple of autonomy of the parties should allow them these choices……».  
161 ibid., at par. 18.  
162 ibid., at par. 19. 
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tration agreement from having to keep a watchful eye upon parallel court proceedings in 
another jurisdiction……»163 (emphasis added).   
Ultimately, the House of Lords, placing great emphasis upon the ratio served by anti-suit in-
junction, opined that such a remedy incentivizes parties to submit their differences to arbitra-
tion seated in a place providing for it as a means of irrevocably "locking" the proper perfor-
mance of their agreement164. In that respect, if the Member States «……are unable to offer a 
seat of arbitration capable of making orders restraining parties from acting in breach of an 
arbitration agreement, there is no shortage of others states which will. For example, New 
York, Bermuda and Singapore......»165.  
Although the aforementioned methodologically exhaustive argumenation inspired a confi-
dence to the House of Lords, the latter was meant to be deceived since the answer of the ECJ 
gave the coup-de-grâce to common law. Notwithstanding the literal, systematical and teleo-
logical argumentation, even when made by the authority of a civilian academic in order to a 
priori "dismantle" any european scepticism, the ECJ was again not convinced. From its angle, 
even if some sort of proceedure is excluded from the ratione materiae scope of the Regulation 
Brussels I, yet anti-suit injunction is capable of obstructing a court in exerting the authority 
conferred by it in the area of its application166. So, according to the ECJ, if a dispute is regu-
lated by the Brussels I Regulation as such, then «……a preliminary issue concerning the ap-
plicability of an arbitration agreement, including in particular its validity also……»167 does 
not evade to be caught in its toils; and exaclty, this was the case at bar where the main dispute 
was a delictual claim governed by art.5 §3 of the given Regulation168.Consequently, anti-suit 
injunction could not be allowed in such a case.  
Additionally, returning to its stable positions, the ECJ advocated that anti-suit injunction poi-
sons the judicial system twofold. First, it contravenes the foundation stone principle of the 
Regulation Brussels I, pursuant to which state courts equally enjoy their own power to rule 
upon their jurisdiction169, and moreover in so doing it undermines the mutual trust amongst 
member states170. Simultaneously, at litigants’ level, it "blows up" the bridge leading to na-
                                               
163 ibid.  
164 ibid.,at par. 20. 
165 ibid., at par. 21. 
166 See C-185/07 West Tankers [2009], op.cit., at par. 24.   
167 ibid., at par.26. 
168 ibid., at par.27. 
169 ibid., at par.29.   
170 ibid., at par.30.  
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tional courts, which practically is tantamount to a violation of the fundamental right to have 
access to the states’ system of dispensation of justice171.   
Lastly, in a clear attempt to embellish its reasoning with comparative arguments of interna-
tional weight, the ECJ invoked article II (3) of the NYC and probably mainly its last intent as 
in its eyes reinforces its conclusion. So, to the ECJ’s perception, that provision172 purports that 
national courts are permitted to exercise their competence to adjudicate upon their jurisdiction 
in spite of the existence of an arbitration agreement since they are empowered to review its 
validity173. 
Despite the fact that this time the ECJ endeavored to conduct a spherical and comprehensive 
analysis in order to defend itself against the incisive criticism suffered all the previous years 
by the common law community, its interpetative efforts err on many points.Insisting on em-
bracing by any means an inflexible literal approach, it resulted in misreading the Regulation 
Brussels I and therefore deteriorating the quality of justice, rendered either by state courts or 
arbitral tribunals in member states, on the following concisely exposed grounds: 
a) First of all, the literal interpretation suggested abolish the exception of arbitration clearly 
laid down by the Brussels I Regulation for any civil and commercial dispute by defintion a 
priori falls within the latter’s ambit and therefore on ECJ’s logic it should not be subject to the 
arbitration exclusion. So, as is aplty remarked, in each case the initial question should be fo-
cused upon «……whether the matter fell within the parapeters of the Regulation at 
all;……»174 since if there is an agreement to submitt to arbitration a commercial or civil dis-
pute, then despite its legal nature the Regulation cannot be ad hoc applicable due to this juris-
dictional shifting from national courts to arbitral tribunals. Besides, exactly that delegation of 
judicial authority to arbitrators is the reason why there is no violation of the fundamental right 
to have access to state courts, as parties voluntarily have chosen not to exercise it by binding 
themselves to have recource to arbitration.  
b) In addition, the blind application of the mutual trust principle, however enthralling might it 
be, goes so far as to generate considerable procedural impediments to the prompt resolution of 
disputes by the arbitral tribunals. However, in so doing, it amputates the efficacy of arbitra-
                                               
171 ibid., at par.31.  
172 Pursuant to which «……The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed……». 
173 See C-185/07 West Tankers [2009], op.cit., at par.33. 
174 See Harris, op.cit., p.I-187.  
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tion and therefore in effect subverts the function of the single european judicial space, which 
at the bottom line, is the ulterior purpose of its unification.   
c) Ultimately, the oversimplistic argument drawn by the NYC is at least far-fetched for the 
aforementioned provision does not take any clear position as to the way by which the negative 
obligation emanating from the arbitration agreement not to litigate can be enforced and as 
such it is utterly open to contradictory readings, that are absolutely unsuitable for reaching 
any stable conclusion;but even if the NYC clearly rejected the use of anti-suit injunction, its 
stance would not matter in the EU context since from institutional aspect it does not constitute 
intergral part of its distinct legal order.    
Consequently, all the above mentioned factors unquestionably witnessed that the grammatical 
arguments alone constitute absolutely insufficient interpetative crutches that cannot bear the 
burden of a complete, persuasive and the most significant sustainable reasoning, able to serve 
the original needs of a competitive unified judicial system. Bearing in mind that summus ius, 
summa injuria, the demand for a teleological approach curing the weaknesses arisen by the 
language adopted by the Brussels I Regulation at this stage of jurisprudential deadlock be-
came more than evident.  
 
ii)Gazprom175 
The reverberations of West Tankers were huge as the ECJ crossed the red line set not only by 
common law, but the legal community as a whole. Its flop to satisfy the self-evident require-
ments for the proper operation of international commercial arbitration unified the voices 
fiercely criticising its argumentative inertia176.The ECJ was in an urgent need to reverse the 
pervasive negativism against it. Thus, it pounced at the opportunity to do penance for its sins 
when the Gazprom was pregnant with the favourable conditions. The peculiarity of that case 
paved the way for a noticeable variation in its jurisprudence, which only the course of time 
will finally prove if it is meant to be a turning point in its stance177. In particular, the dispute 
involved the granting of an anti-suit injunction by an arbitral tribunal seated in Sweden and 
the subsequent request for its recognition and enforcement in the Lithuanian Republik178. The 
                                               
175 C-536/13 Gazprom [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:316.  
176 Acording to the AG opinion C-536/2013 Gazprom [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2414, at par.98 «…… 
Comments criticising that judgment came essentially from the world of private international law and 
arbitration, the essential part of the criticism being that in reality it had extended the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation to arbitration in a way that could udermine its effectiveness……». 
177 It is particularly expected what will be the subsequent stance of the ECJ, but at the moment there is 
no other decision in the pipeline.    
178 It is interesting to follow the thread of the full history behind the issue at question: The case referred 
to a company, named "Lietuvos dujos AB" (hereinafter Lietuvos dujos), that was formed under Lithua-
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court seised of the latter application, simultaneously examined on appeal the substance of the 
case intended to be blocked. Concisely, it  ruled that as the difference, in favor of which the 
anti-suit injunction was granted, lacked arbitrability under Lithuanian law in accordance with 
an already delivered decision of Lithuanian courts  at first instance179, it was forced to dismiss 
the granting of recognition and enforcement and the appeal, at the same time. Additionally, in 
its view, the contentious anti-suit injunction posed under question the authority of Lithuanian 
courts to self-determine their own jurisdiction and therefore it violated their constitutionally 
entrenched independence with the result the request at stake to be contrary to Lithuanian pub-
lic policy, as well. The case culminated in the Lithuanian Supreme Court which referred the 
case for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, raising the question as to whether a court of a mem-
ber state is empowered to refuse the recognition and enforcement of an award restraining its 
competenence to determine its jurisdiction, as conferrred by the Brussels I Regulation, and in 
any case whether it can act accordingly, in order to safeguard the primacy of the EU law and 
                                                                                                                                      
nian law and aimed at buying gas from "Gazprom". At the time of crucial facts, it belonged to three 
main shareholders, the German company "E.ON Ruhrgas International GmbH" (38,91%), the Russian 
public undertaking "Gazprom" (37,1%) and the Lithuanian Republik (17,1%). On 24th March 2004, all 
of them entered into a "shareholders’ agreement", governed by Lithuanian law, which provided, inter 
alia, for the resolution of the relevant disputes by way of an arbitration mechanism in accordance with 
the Rules of the SCC. In particular, that term stated that «……any claim, dispute or contravention in 
connection with this Agreement or its breach, validity, effect or termination, shall be finally settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. The place of arbitration shall be Stockholm, Sweden, the number of arbitrators shall be 
three (all to be appointed by the Arbitration Institute) and the language of arbitration shall be 
English......», see the opinion of the AG,op.cit., at par.29. Despite its contractual engangement, on 26th 
March 2011, the  Ministry of Energy on behalf of the Lithuanian Republik brought an action before 
Lithuanian courts against the Lietuvos dujos, its general manager and two members of its board of 
directors, whom it accused of unduly favoring Gazprom’s interests and therefore asked the removal 
from their positions and additionally the renegotiation of the purchasing price of gas with Gazprom. In 
response, the latter commenced arbitral proceedings against the Lithuanian Ministry before the SCC, 
asking for the withdrawal of its action, which on 31th July 2012, was partly accepted by a final award 
ordering it on the one hand to withdraw and on the other to reframe some of its requests. Nonetheless, 
in the meanwhile, on 3rd Septermber 2012, the Lithouanian court accepted the claim, holding that the 
latter was lacking arbitrability under Lithunian law and as such was exclusively subject to its 
jurisdiction. The judgment was challenged by the losing parties before the court of appeal which in 
parallel had to adjudicate upon the request submitted by Gazprom for the recognition and enforcement 
of the arbitral award delivered by the SCC. For further details see the elaborate factual background in 
the AG opinion, op.cit., at par.21-49.   
179 ibid, at par.42.  
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the full effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation180, connoting that the the last ones should be 
regarded as part of the public policy of the forum under article V (2) (b) NYC. That factual 
background enabled both, the AG and the Grand Chamber of the ECJ to gather the momentun 
and gain some of the lost ground by turning the element referring to arbitration to account. 
To begin with181, it should be borne in mind that the Lithuanian court referring the case to the 
ECJ operated in a dual capacity. So, it was competent for the recognition and enforcement of 
the anti-suit injunction where the arbitration agreement was the main subject matter and in 
parallel for adjudicating upon the substance of the dispute allegedly submitted to arbitration 
where the arbitration agreement was a prelimanary issue. Hence, in order to be systematically 
consistent, the argumentantion of the AG was based on two dinstict pillars.  
On the one hand, at the level of the recognition and enforcement, he focused on the origin of 
the given anti-suit injunction from an arbitral tribunal in order to exclude it from the ratione 
materiae scope of the Brussels I Regulation by virtue of the crystal clear language of article 
32 thereof. According to that provision, the decisions which are to be recognised and enforced 
within its regime shall be exclusively issued by national courts182, 183. 
On the other hand, at the level of the substance of the dispute at stake, the AG, being aware 
that the Lithuanian court was in the same position as that of the Italian one in West Tankers, 
attempted to surmount the obstacle raised by its adopted interpetation. So, he examined the 
case through the prism of the controversial exception of arbitration from the ambit of the 
Regulation (art.1§2d), as its dimensions are circumscribed in the light of the recital 12184 of 
                                               
180 Actually, initially there was another question as to whether the same answer would be delivered if 
the case at stake was pending before the court of another member state. However, the AG rejected it as 
impermissible, inter allia, due to its putative character, see AG opinion, op.cit.,at par.159.The ECJ from 
its part, consolidated all the topics raised into one single query as to whether the Brussels I Regulation 
regime is to be construed as preventing a court of a member state from recognising and enforcing a 
foreign arbitral award containing in essence an anti-suit injunction and as such enjoining a party from 
bringing a claim before its  national courts, see C-536/13 Gazprom [2015], op.cit., at par.26-27.   
181 It is to be underlined that in the AG’s view the questions referred were characterised by debatable 
admissibility as the main dispute could be resolved irrespective of their being answered, see AG opin-
ion, op.cit., at par.58-61.  
182 ibid, at par.71. 
183 Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation states that «For the purposes of this Regulation ‘judgment’ 
means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be 
called, including a decree, order, decision, or a writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs 
or expenses by an officer of the court».  
184 The full text of that recital, for the sake of which rivers of ink will definitely flow in an attempt to 
interpetet it, is as follows: «…… This Regulation shall not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regula-
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the Brussels I Regulation recast -despite the latter was not applicalbe to the case at issue-, 
which «……in reality, somewhat in the manner of a retroactive interpretative law, explains 
how that exclusion must be and always should have been interpreted……»185. Unfolding the 
long history of its drafting186 and reading selectively, isolated from its entirety, some of its 
paragraphs in combination with the jurisprudential positions accepted before the Waterloo of 
West Tankers187, he ignored the overall and thus systematically consistent interpretation of the 
crucial recital as a whole. On the contrary, he concetrated on the second paragraph188,189 of the 
recital 12, which, in his opinion, strongly advocates that «……the EU legislature intended to 
correct the boundary which the court has traced between the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation and arbitration……»190 so that the verification of the validity of an arbitration 
                                                                                                                                      
tion should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a matter in respect of 
whch the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, 
from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in accordance with their national law. 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and 
enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardeless of whether the court decided on this as a princi-
pal issue or as an incidental question. 
On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation or 
under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or inca-
pable of being performed, this should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter 
from being recognised  or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This 
should be without prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at  New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the 1958 New York 
Convention’), which takes precedence over this Regulation. 
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration proce-
dure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the annul-
ment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award……». 
185 See the AG opinion,op.cit., at par.91. 
186 ibid., at par.92-97 and 113-124. 
187 ibid., at par.98-112. 
188 ibid., at par.125-126.   
189 See in n.184. 
190 See the AG opiniom, op.cit., at par. 132.  
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agreement as an incidental matter not to fall within the scope of the Regulation Brussels I191. 
Besides, in his view, the given position is further reinforced by the clear letter of the fourth 
paragraph192 of the recital 12, as well 193.Therefore, he concluded that «……the recasting of 
the Brussels I Regulation reinstated the interpretation given to the exclusion of arbitration 
from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation by the judgment in Rich……, according to which 
‘the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety’……»  194, 195 (empha-
sis added), namely either as a main or an incidental matter. In any event and in the alternatine, 
underscored that «....... Αrbitral tribunals cannot be bound by the principle of mutual 
trust……»196,197  since inherently the latter presupposes state courts, view espoused by the ECJ, 
as well.  
In addition, as regards the last part of the referred question, the AG refuted the implied idea198 
that the public policy under article V(2)(b) NYC199 is to be interpreted as refusing the recogni-
tion and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award containing an anti-suit injunction where the 
latter restrains the right of a national court to ascertain its own jurisdiction on the basis of the 
Brussels I Regulation. Underlining the restrictive reading of public policy, which is rest ex-
clusively upon national courts, he examined its concept on a comparative basis and remarked 
that the ECJ has sparingly characterised provisions of the EU law as containing public policy 
considerations, such as that of article 101 TFEU200, 201. Ultimately, he reached the conclusion 
                                               
191 Under that construction, the AG reached the conclusion that the anti-suit injunction in West Tankers 
would have been found compatible with the Brussels I Regulation, ibid., at par. 134-135 
192 See in n.184. 
193 See, the AG opinion, op.cit, at par. 137-138, 140.  
194 ibid., at par.141. 
195 So, in the AG’s view the recognition and enforcement of such an anti-suit injunction is exclusively 
governed by the NYC, ibid., at par.157. 
196 ibid., at par.152. 
197 On that point, the AG exclaimed «……what could an arbitral tribunal do, when it considers that 
the arbitration agreement from which it derives its jurisdiction has been breached by one of the par-
ties, other than order that party to comply with the agreement and to submit to the arbitrators all its 
claims covered by the agreement?An anti-suit injunction is therefore the only effective remedy avail-
able to an arbitral tribunal in order to rule in favour of the party who considers that the arbitration 
agreement has been breached by the other contracting party……» (emphasis added), ibid., at par. 155.  
198 ibid., at par.163. 
199 However, it is rather debatable whether the ECJ has the competence to interpret the notion of public 
policy enschrined in the NYC, even if the latter could incorporate some elemenents of the EU legal 
order.  
200 C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR 1999 I-03055. 
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that the main criterion shall be focused on whether «……the rules and values involved are 
among those breach of which cannot be tolerated by the legal order of the place in which 
recognition and enforcement are sought……»202 . Under that construction, the Brussels I 
Regulation could not be regarded as public policy legislation203 for it does not obviously in-
corporates such considerations and additionally can be derogated from under certain condi-
tions by forum selection agreements 204. Besides, in any event, article 35 (3) thereof crystal-
lizes that the rules on jurisdiction are not connected with public policy 205, 206, 207.   
Contrary to the extensive analysis employed by the AG, the response of the ECJ was succinct 
and unequivocal. Hastening to dispel the clouds of discredit generated by West Tankers, it 
clarified that the Brussels I Regulation governs exclusively the relationship of a national court  
vis-a-vis other national courts throughout the EU208.Therefore anti-suit injunctions rendered 
by arbitral tribunals are by definition not burdened with the duty of no interference in the ju-
risdiction of state courts deriving from the fundamental principal of mutual trust amongst na-
tional legal orders of member states209. Nevertheless, this fact does not lay bare, id est devoid 
of legal protection, the party, against whom such an anti-suit injunction is directed. In con-
strast, the latter is fully armed with the right to defend her/himself in the course of the proce-
dure for its recognition and enforcement, based on the law being applicable by the forum210. 
Consequently, «……neither that arbitral award211 nor the decision by which, as the case may 
be, the court of a Member State recognises it are capable of affecting the mutual trust be-
tween the courts of the various Members States upon which Regulation 44/2001 is 
                                                                                                                                      
201 Similarly, the Council Directive 93/12/EEC of 5 April 1993 "on unfair terms in concumer contracts" 
(OJ 21.04.1993 No L95/29-32), see C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR 2006 I-10421.  
202 See the AG opinion, op.cit., at par.177.  
203 ibid., at par.181. 
204 ibid., at par.183-184. 
205 Specifically, the provision of article 35 (3) states «……3. Subject to the paragraph 1, the jurisdic-
tion of the court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed. The test of public policy referred 
to in point 1 of Article 34 may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction……»(emphasis add-
ed). 
206 See the AG opinion, op.cit., at par.186. 
207 Of course, as the AG observed that the mere fact that a particular discipline of law falls within the 
exclusive or shared powers of the EU (art. 3 and 4 TFEU), is self-evidently not sufficient for its charac-
terisation as containing public policy provisions, ibid., at par.182. 
208 See C-536/13 Gazprom, op.cit., at par.36. 
209 ibid., at par.36-37. 
210 ibid., at par.38. 
211 Namely, the award containing the anti-suit injunction (citation  added upon clarification’s grounds).  
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based……»212. So, the ECJ in full harmony with the AG resulted in a teleologically expedient  
and systematically consistent position, the applicablitily of which however is limited to anti-
suit injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals.In particular, such an approach cannot be extended 
mutatis mutandis in an equally invincible way to anti-suit injunctions granted by state courts 
since recital 12 of the Brussels I Regulation recast construed as a whole, is open to divirgent 
interpretations and therefore, in reality it does not deliver such an assertive reply, as will be 
elaborated on at the respective paragraph213.     
 
3. A first pre-conclusion  
Certainty, mutual trust and self-determination of competence constitute fundamental values, 
which are enshrined in the Brussels I Regulation in order to be observed not as a self-end, but 
as servants of the notion of justice. Nevertheless, the latter is heavily wounded where in their 
name a parasitic environment functioning as a hotbed of abusive procedural conducts is bred 
under the blessings of the ECJ. Namely,as revealed, its aforementioned jurisprudence has one 
decisive element in common, the tidy reward of the shrewd litigant who incessantly attempts 
to manipulate national courts to stick in the letter of law in order to mangle its spirit; whilst in 
turn the last ones wash their hands of their own responsibility to take the lead of decisions by 
exploiting every single interpretative tool at their disposal, resulting in engulfing the interests 
of the diligent litigant. 
 In effect, the whole story strikingly reminds a Greek proverb stating that the operation was 
successful, but the patient died, which implies that the religious application of rules alone 
does not guarantee the desirable result since those have inherent flaws. Thus, self-action is 
indispensable, as well. However, the ECJ, save Gazprom, has stubbornly refused to teleologi-
cally read the Regulation Brussels I where this could be an option, namely in forum selection 
and arbitration agreements214. So, in the absence of such a generous construction, addressing 
in any case the problem in the short-term, a legislative initiative seemed more than indispen-
sable in order to eliminate it once and for all in the long-term as the delaying and tactical ma-
noeuvring, cultivated under the Brussels I Regulation, made the entire system to resemble a 
plumbing network being out of order and therefore in dire need of a drastic corrective inter-
vention.  
 
II. The paradigm of the Brussels I Regulation recast 
                                               
212 See C-536/13 Gazprom, op.cit., at par. 39.  
213 See Section II under II (2). 
214 De lege lata, forum non-conveniens doctrine’s application could not be considered as a viable option, 
see Section II under I (2) (a) (i). 
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The response was delivered by the Brussels I Regulation recast215, which has been the product 
of a lengthy reflection process, under which many compromises have been inescapably incu-
bated. The controversial rule of lis alibi pendens symbolizes one of them since after the fail-
ure of its strict application, its absolutism had to be relativized by cautiously designed excep-
tions to counterbalance its loopholes. The question as to whether its new version satisfies the 
praxis is dealt with individually for each basic category of cases, as were classified above 216, 
ranked in the order of the degree of their success in accomplishing that goal, as follows:     
 
1. Forum selection agreements     
That group of cases is the only one that has been coped with expressly, exhaustively and effec-
tively.Specifically, article 31 §2 and 3 Brussels I Regulation recast states that «……2.Without 
prejudice to article 26, where a court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred 
to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any court of another Member State 
shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement 
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement. 3.Where the court designated in the 
agreement has established jurisdiction in accordance with agreement, any court of another 
Member State shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court……»217. Its precise language 
coupled with the recital 22218, which mirrors all the points arisen out of the aforementioned 
                                               
215 Regulation EU No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
"on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters" 
(recast) (OJ L351/1-32 20/12/2012). 
216 See Section I under III (1) (a) (i, ii, iii).   
217 §4 of art.31 provides for an exception in favour of the presumably weaker parties in insurance, la-
bour and consumer disputes, stating that «……4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to matters re-
ferred to in Sections 3, 4 or 5 where the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance con-
tract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee is the claimant and the agreement is not valid 
under a provision contained within those Sections……».  
218 Recital 22 of the Brussels I Regulation recast states that «……in order to enhance the effectiveness 
of exclusive choice- of- court agreements and to avoid abusive litigation tactics, it is necessary to pro-
vide for an exception to the general lis pendens rule in order to deal satisfactorily with a particular 
situation in which concurrent proceedings may arise. This is the situation where a court not designated 
in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement has been seised of proceedings and the designated court is 
seised subsequently of proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties. In 
such a case, the court first seised should be required to stay its proceedings as soon as the designated 
court has been seised and until such time as the latter court declares that it has no jurisdiction under 
the exclusive choice-of-court agreement. This is to ensure that, in such a situation, the designated 
court has priority to decide on the validity of the agreement and on the extent to which the agreement 
applies to the dispute pending before it. The designated court should be able to proceed  irrespective of 
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case-law219, do not leave any room for doubting its real meaning, namely that the designated 
by an exclusive forum selection agreement court take precedence over any other irrespective 
of the order of filing. This practically means that anti-suit injunctions in favour of the forum 
contractually conferred jurisdiction shall constitute an  indisputably permissible remedy from 
here on. Considering that under the new regime the suspension of proceedings by any other 
than the designated court shall be taken for granted, their issuance could serve the prevention 
from even entering into the examination of a case whatever this means in terms of spending 
money and time.  
   
2. Arbitrations agreements  
Against that background of clarity, arbitration agreements regime unfortunately has remained 
in the dark. It is fully indicative of the the drafters’ Brussels I Regulation recast legislative 
timidity, bred by the utterly divergent approaches suggested220, that they preferred to intro-
duce a non-binding legal text of allegedly interpretative value than to insert a normative pro-
vision with an analogous content as that concerning forum selection agreements221, namely  
giving priority to the courts of the arbitral seat. So, they have culminated in adding recital 
12222, which however is equally ambivalent as the prophecies given by Pythia in the Oracle of 
Delphi. Consequently, in the loud absence of a clear solution, the point is whether the lan-
guage used by it is susceptible of resulting in an equivalent effect, advancing the efficacy of 
arbitral proceedings.   
To begin with,recital 12 is dominated by the constant repetition of the exclusion of arbitration 
from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation recast. That principal feature cultivates the mis-
leading impression that the arguments raised in favour of the principle of self-determination 
and mutual trust amongst national courts of member states against the primacy of the courts 
                                                                                                                                      
whether the non-designated court has already decided on the stay of proceedings. This exception 
should not cover situations where the parties have entered into conflicting exclusive choice-of-court 
agreements or where a court designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement has been seised 
first.In such cases, the general lis pendens rule of this Regulation should aplly ……» (emphasis added).   
219 See Section II under I (2) (b). 
220 See a concise reference to them in AG opinion C-536/2013 Gazprom [2014], op.cit., at par.92-97 
and 113-124.   
221 See Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Ju-
risdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 
COM(2010) 748 final, p.36. 
222 See for its full text in n.184.  
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of arbitral seat and therefore anti-suit injunctions in support of them have been confuted223 as 
arbitration supposedly operates in an area of law completely irrelevant to the Brussels I Regu-
lation recast. However, on a closer analysis, the real meaning of a systematically consistent 
reading of recital 12 is solely partly that. Namely, whilst the latter confirms that arbitration as 
a principal subject matter is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation recast224(§4), 
which is an unavailing truism, unfortunatelly it persists with recycling the same problem of 
undermining arbitral proceedings on a multilevel basis where arbitration agreement constitute 
a preliminary question.  
Specifically, paragraphs 1, 2  and 4 in essence repeat that the same exclusion applies to the 
latter case as well and from that angle one could infer on the aforementioned logic regarding 
arbitration as a main issue that the issuance of anti-suit injunctions in aid of arbitral proceed-
ings does not fall within the ambit of the Brussels I Regulation recast and thus cannot be 
blocked. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is not absolutely accurate as what those paragra-
graphs offer with the one hand, paragraph 3 takes it back with the other one.Specifically, the 
latter clarifies that a ruling on the merits of a dispute, which as such has obviously discredited 
arbitration agreement as being null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, not 
only can be issued but additionally is allowed to freely circulate within the EU in order to be 
recognised and enforced. This means that where the ratione materiae scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation recast on the one hand and the arbitration agreement on the other one are inter-
sected by way of a preliminary issue, the exception of arbitration ceases to have the absolute 
effect, which does enjoy by definition where it constitutes the principal and therefore the sin-
gle one question of a trial, and therefore it acquires a relative character. So, the latter simply 
purports that arbitration agreement is judged upon the law applicable by the forum and not the 
Brussels I Regulation recast. Beyond that point, the exception is prevented from having any 
impact on the jurisdiction conferred by the given Regulation to national courts of the member 
states, which are emporewed to move on in order to decide upon the substance of the dispute. 
Under that contruction, as a consequence, anti-suit injunctions can be regarded as an obstacle 
to the performance of courts’ duties. So, in effect, recital 12 unfortunately seems to identify 
with West Tankers approach 225 rather than Gazprom reasoning especially elaborated on by 
the AG, which therefore is almost disarmed and ultimately can survive only by reason of the 
                                               
223 Besides, that is the position of the AG’s opinion C-536/2013 Gazprom [2014], op.cit., at par.132, 
134-135. 
224 Hauberg Wilhelmsen, "European Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration", J Priv Int’l 
L, Vol.10, No.1, p.123. 
225 Leandro, "Towards a New Interface Between Brussels I and Arbitration?", JIDS, 2015, p.10.  
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fact that the given anti-suit injunction originated from an arbitral tribunal and as such by defi-
nition fell outside the scope of the Regulation226.  
Additionally, such an interpretation, namely that arbitration as preliminary matter does not 
preclude proceedings of courts to go ahead, is further reinforced by the crystal clear fact that 
paragraph 3 of recital 12 literally acknowledges the simultaneous operation of two parallel 
and competitive systems of delivering justice from national courts and arbitral tribunals. This 
firm acceptance connotes that Brussels I Regulation recast regime does not establish, even 
indirectly, any primacy in favour of arbitral tribunals and thus the last ones are forced to go 
along with state courts hand in hand without being entitled to be supported by anti-suit injunc-
tions’ shield of protection. This approach is not influenced by the last intent of paragraph 3, 
which makes a reference to the precedence of the NYC over the Regulation since it simply 
implies that a state court’s decision subject to the recognition and enforcement framework of 
the Regulation shall not affect the exequatur proceedings of an arbitral award pending in a 
member state227.  
Consequently, if the novel lis alibi pendens rule upon forum selection agreements’ was a step 
forward, the management of arbitration agreements was ten step backwards. The exclusion of 
arbitration in the way by which is adopted has led to the formal foundation of two parallel and 
antagonistic procedures228, that being capable of reaching contradictory rulings, not only pol-
lutes the climate of certainty, intended to be established, but additionally subverts the credibil-
ity of the whole judicial system.  
 
 
                                               
226 Of course, there is an opposite view, according to which even where an anti-suit injunction is issued 
by an arbitral tribunal, it still restrains «……both the exercise of the jurisdiction under the Brussels I 
rules and the connected right of access to a court. As s result, the anti-suit injunction should not be 
enforced in the member State where it gives rise to such effects. It does not matter that the arbitral an-
ti-suit injunction falls outside the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation, as does indeed the anti-suit 
injunction granted by a court:the interest in question is, in fact, to protect the Brussels I Regulation 
effet utile against measures like the anti-suit injunctions as far as the functioning of the rules on juris-
diction is concerned……», ibid., p.11. Despite the fact that the aforementioned syllogism has a strong 
point, it is an extra legem interpretation, which is not teleologically approved since it shrinks even 
more the potential of arbitral tribunals to perform their duties.   
227 It is submitted that the given interpretative instruction applies where the recognition and enforce-
ment proceedings regarding an arbitral award precede those referring to a judgment under the Brussels 
I Regulation recast, see Hauberg Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p.125. However, the inverse case does not mean 
that the Convention is not applicable, see Leandro,op.cit., p.9. 
228 Hauberg Wilhelmsen, op.cit. 
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3. Forum non-conveniens cases 
The failure of establishing a reliable modus operandi for arbitration agreements, which consti-
tute an institution equally embraced by civil and common law, has meant that the anticipation 
to regulate the category of forum non conveniens cases, even in the disguised form of Turner 
229, was unrealistic. Civilian codifications of procedural law, constantly oriented to safeguard 
certainty via the obligatory compliance with the respectively applicable rules, could not toler-
ate the vagueness deriving from the discretionary power conferred by virtue of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine. So, the latter was an intruder within the system of Brussels I Regulation 
recast, from which therefore has been exiled.  
Nonetheless, those reservations are not totally justified, taking into consideration that the fo-
rum non-conveniens concept may not have a corrolary to civil law jurisdictions, but its logic 
strikingly resembles the well-known to civilian jurists function of the legal provisions intro-
ducing the so-called generic clauses, such as good faith. Pursuant to a stereotype wording, 
those ones are regarded as abstract legal concepts, that are to be specified by the judge with 
regard to the particular conditions of a case and so by definition are adjustable to each differ-
ence.This indicates that both230 concepts primarily target at the specification of the concrete 
factors of a case in order to allow the judge to burst the heavy fetters of the rigidity of law and 
therefore dispense individual, namely substantial, justice. Exactly, from that angle, both of 
them are pure expressions of the equity, as each legal family conceives it.231 So, viewed 
through that lens, forum non-conveniens doctrine does not appear at last to be so alien to the 
civilian community and in that respect the absolute suspicion against its application and thus 
its a priori overruling is nieder legitimate nor expedient. Only its in concreto examination on a 
case by case basis and therefore its ex posteriori assessement in the light of the given factual 
conditions shall determine its judicial treatment. 
Furthermore, on closer examination, it should be additionally observed that the jurisprudential 
criteria crystallized for sustaining the forum non-conveniens objection in essence coincide 
with those established for undergoing the proportionality test232, which by the way is a purely 
                                               
229 See Section II under I (2) (a) (ii). 
230 See Section I under III (1) (a) (i). 
231 Besides, genuine justice should have wide shut only its eyes and not its ears.  
232 The principle of proportionality was originally cultivated in the framework of the German Police 
Law and subsequently has been evolved to such an extent so as to become a general principle of  Public 
Law, which regulates the relationship between state and citizens. In particular, traditionally it functions 
as a restriction of the boundaries set up by the executive or legislative power to the citizens’ fundamen-
tal rights, namely as "a restriction of the restrictions" ("Schranken-Schranke" is the original German 
term). In parallel, its application  has been extended to areas of Private Law as well, in which, however, 
it acts as an initial limitation to the exercise of rights; but the field where it has laid the foundations for 
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civilian brainchild. So, as illustrated in more detail above233, forum non-conveniens doctrine 
in the context of granting anti-suit injunctions, on the one hand presuposses that such condi-
tions are fulfilled so that a local forum is much more equipped than that seised of an action 
abroad to adjudicate upon a dispute in terms of grasping deeper command of the applicable 
law, ensuring proximity of evidences for fascilitating the hearings and reaching a considera-
bly fairer decision and therefore saving money and time. That practically means that the local 
forum is more appropriate234 to rule on the dispute, which constitute the first dimension of the 
proportinality principle. At the same time, on the other hand, foreign proceedings are required 
to be oppresive and vexatious, elements that make the local forum additionally necessary235 
for the proper resolution of the difference, which expresses the second aspect of proportional-
ity. Lastly, the condition that the counter litigant shall not suffer an excessive injustice by be-
ing devoid of rights acknowledged by the foreign legal order clearly connotes the weighing of 
the latter’s cost in comparison with the benefits of the litigant invoking the forum non-
conveniens plea, which represents the so-called stricto sensu proportionality236. So, it seems 
that when desiphering the forum non-conveniens doctrine to the "civilian language" by the 
familiar to civil law jurists means of the principle of proportionality, it becomes not only 
comprehensible, but admissible as well237.          
Under that view, the insertion of a provision in the form of a general clause for allowing na-
tional courts to disdain abusive procedural conducts by dismissing an action brought in bad 
faith based on the civilian reading of the forum non-conveniens test, would be most welcome 
as long as its application was confined to exceptional circumstances, which by definition 
should be the case. If such a rule could additionally prevail towards lis alibi pendens one, as 
well, it would ideally armour the entire sytem of jurisdictional allocation throughout the EU 
                                                                                                                                      
the re-determination of the rights’ area of smooth operation is individual and collective Labour Law. 
The right to dismiss and strike,  on which pivotal interests of the employer and the employee are conti-
gent, constitute the most representantive examples of its catalytic influnce, which has been underpinned  
by a vast case-law, as well.See for a deep analysis of all those considerations and an extensive and ex-
haustive critical approach of the relevant German and Greek jurisprudence, Ζερδελής, Η απόλυση ως 
ultima ratio, passim; Ζερδελής, Αναλογικότητα και Απεργία, passim.          
233 See Section I under III (1) (a) (i). 
234 Grundsatz der Geeignetheit (the exact German term). 
235 Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit or Notwendigkeit (the exact German term). 
236 Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit im engeren Sinne or Grundsatz der Proportionalität (the exact 
German term). 
237 Considering always the extensive application of proportionality test by civil law jurisdictions. 
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against stratagems aiming at misusing it in order to dishearten the diligent litigant by causing 
excessive delay and cost.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The European legislator has opted for fragmentary combating the side-effects of the indis-
criminate application of the lis alibi pendens rule by repressing solely the tactic of infringing 
forum selection clauses via the adoption of a rather pioneering provision at least for the civil 
law standards. The indisputable primacy of the designated court seems to open a new chapter 
in the history of anti-suit injunction within the civilian jurisdictions governed by the Brussels 
I Regulation recast. Nevertheless, its path does not seem to be paved with rose petals where 
anti-injunction is intended to be used as a hedge against the violation of arbitration agree-
ments and the forum non-conveniens doctrine. While the European family has not yet become 
mature enough to assimilate the latter in order to adjust it to the design of the EU procedural 
law, common sense rebels at the missing of the unique boat to re-conceinve the interplay be-
tween litigation and arbitration in such a way so as to transform Europe to a magnetic pole of 
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